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ABSTRACT. Courts have long struggled to distinguish legislative rules, which are designed to
have binding legal effect and must go through the rulemaking procedure known as notice and
comment, from nonlegislative rules, which are not meant to have binding legal effect and are
exempted from notice and comment. The distinction has been called "tenuous," "baffling," and
"enshrouded in considerable smog."
What is just as baffling is that prominent commentators such as John Manning, William
Funk, Donald Elliott, and Jacob Gersen have proposed a simple solution to the problem -and
courts have failed to take them up on it. Rather than inquiring into a rule's nature or effects to
decide whether it must undergo notice and comment, these commentators urge, courts should
turn the question inside-out and ask whether the rule has undergone notice and comment in
order to determine whether it can be made legally binding. This proposal, which I call the "short
cut," would economize on judicial decision costs. Moreover, its proponents say, it would not
reduce oversight of the administrative process, because agencies would often opt to submit their
rules to notice and comment ex ante in order to ensure that they are treated as legally binding ex
post. Lately, proponents of the short cut such as Manning and Gersen have argued that their
position is strengthened by the Supreme Court's 2001 Mead decision, which presumptively
disqualifies nonlegislative rules from Chevron deference.
This Article explains not only why judges have resisted the short cut, but also why they
have been wise to do so. It argues that caution is warranted for three reasons: the short cut
inadequately protects the interests of those persons, particularly regulatory beneficiaries, whose
interests are affected by deregulatory or permissive agency pronouncements; it stands in tension
with the longstanding principle that agencies may choose to announce new policy through either
adjudication or rulemaking; and it ignores important differences between public scrutiny at the
promulgation stage and heightened judicial scrutiny at the enforcement stage. Nor, I argue, does
the Mead decision lend decisive force to the arguments in favor of the short cut, because
nonlegislative rules are often accorded substantial deference in practice. These, in short, are the
perils of the short cut.
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INTRODUCTION
There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in the field of administrative
law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between legislative
and nonlegislative rules. The problem is relatively easy to state. Under
standard doctrine, these two types of rules differ from one another in both a
substantive and a procedural sense. Substantively, legislative rules are designed
to have binding legal effect on both the issuing agency and the regulated
public; procedurally, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires such
rules to undergo the expensive and time-consuming process known as notice-
and-comment rulemaking before being promulgated.' Nonlegislative rules, by
contrast, are not meant to have binding legal effect, and are exempted from
notice and comment by the APA as either "interpretative rules" or "general
statements of policy."'
So far, so good. The problem arises when we leave the airy realm of theory
and enter the untidy arena of litigation. Here is the usual sequence of events: a
federal agency issues some sort of pronouncement -a guidance, a circular, an
advisory-without using notice and comment; parties that believe that they are
adversely affected by the new pronouncement go to court, perhaps before it has
even been enforced against anyone; the challengers argue that the
pronouncement is in fact a legislative rule and is therefore procedurally invalid
for failure to undergo notice and comment.
Even by the standards of administrative law-a field in which uniform,
predictable rules of black-letter law are hard to come by-the resulting
litigation is considered notoriously difficult. The problem is not just that the
Supreme Court has not supplied a test for distinguishing between the two
types of rules, or that the APA does not define the exempt categories of
interpretative rules and general statements of policy. The problem runs deeper:
it turns out to be maddeningly hard to devise a test that reliably determines
which rules are legislative in nature and which are not. Currently, courts do
their best by examining the text, structure, and history of the rule, its
relationship to existing statutes and rules, and the manner in which it has been
enforced (if at all) in an effort to ascertain whether the rule was intended to
have binding legal effect or instead was merely designed to clarify existing law
or to inform the public and lower-level agency employees about the agency's
intentions. Given the amount of indeterminacy built into this inquiry, it is no
wonder that courts have labeled the distinction between legislative and
1. 5 U.S.C. § 55 3 (b)-(c) (20o6).




nonlegislative rules "tenuous," "baffling," and "enshrouded in considerable
smog.",
What seems just as baffling, however, is that for many years,
administrative law scholars have proposed a simple solution to the problem of
distinguishing between these two types of rules - and courts have failed to take
them up on it. The scholars' proposal is disarmingly simple; indeed, it is not so
much a solution as a way of making the problem disappear. It runs as follows:
rather than asking whether a challenged rule was designed to be legally
binding in order to determine whether it must undergo notice and comment,
courts should simply turn the question inside-out and ask whether the rule has
undergone notice and comment in order to determine whether it can be made
legally binding. Rules that have been through notice and comment would be
accorded the force of law in later enforcement actions; rules that have not been
through notice and comment would be denied such force. No longer would a
rule's substantive nature dictate its procedural provenance; instead, its
procedural provenance would determine its substantive effect.4
This approach-which I will call the "short cut," for short-has
tremendous appeal. Most attractively, it would economize on judicial decision
costs by eliminating at one stroke the need for courts to divine the intrinsic
nature or purpose of any challenged rule or to develop any elaborate test for
distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative rules. Instead, courts
would simply shunt aside all challenges raising questions of procedural validity
under the APA. At the enforcement stage, too, courts would merely need to
ascertain the procedural provenance of the challenged rule - almost always a
very simple tasks - to determine the uses to which the rule could validly be put.
3. See infra notes 46-50.
4. Even under this approach, there might still be exceptions. A rule subject to the APA but
enacted without notice and comment could still be given legal effect if it dealt with an
exempt subject matter such as military or foreign affairs, 5 U.S.C. 5 553(a) (2006), or if the
agency could show good cause for dispensing with notice and comment, id. § 553(b)(B).
And an agency might choose to conduct notice and comment while making clear that the
resulting rule is nonbinding. These additional possibilities are discussed infra text
accompanying notes 161-163.
5. 1 say "almost always" because there can occasionally be dispute about whether notice-and-
comment procedures were complied with, or whether noncompliance constituted harmless
error. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174-76 (2007)
(considering and rejecting the argument that the Department of Labor's notice-and-
comment process was inadequate); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 40o F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (holding that an FCC order setting conditions under which wireline
telecommunications carriers were required to transfer telephone numbers to wireless
carriers was a legislative rule but that the agency's failure to follow notice and comment was
harmless error).
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The most obvious objection to the short cut is that it would substantially
diminish judicial and public oversight of the administrative process by leaving
agencies free to eschew notice and comment at their unreviewable discretion.
But the proponents of the short cut have a response to this objection. Agencies,
they argue, would still need to submit their rules to robust scrutiny at some
stage: either scrutiny by the public during the notice-and-comment period or,
if the agency opts to dispense with notice and comment, enhanced scrutiny by
the courts during judicial review of enforcement action.' This component of
the short cut argument is crucial enough that it deserves its own name: the
"trade-off." The trade-off asserts that agencies -recognizing that they must
either "pay now or pay later"' in terms of defending their substantive policy
choices-would decide, at least much of the time, to submit their rules to
notice and comment ex ante in exchange for the assurance that those rules will
be treated as legally binding ex post. As a result, say the proponents of the
short cut, their proposal would not lead to any appreciable decrease in
substantive oversight of the administrative state.
In recent years, advocates of the short cut have added another arrow to
their quiver. The trade-off at the heart of the short cut, they argue, has been
implicitly embraced by the Supreme Court in its decision in United States v.
Mead Corp.,8 which holds that nonlegislative rules are presumptively
disqualified from deferential judicial review under the Chevron doctrine.' After
Mead, the argument goes, it is clearer than ever that agencies cannot have their
cake and eat it too by sidestepping expensive public input at the promulgation
stage while also counting on lenient substantive review from courts at the
enforcement stage.o
The federal courts themselves have never explained why they have not
adopted the short cut in the face of these seemingly compelling arguments in
its favor. This Article fills that gap by accounting for the continued judicial
adherence to the now-traditional (if frustratingly indeterminate) enterprise of
distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative rules in order to
adjudicate claims of procedural invalidity. But the Article has more than merely
descriptive aims. It has a normative objective as well: it seeks to explain not
6. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992).
7. Id. The D.C. Circuit has taken notice of this argument. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d iio6, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
8. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
9. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).




only why judges have resisted the short cut but also why they have been wise
to do so.
Part I of the Article lays out in greater detail the problem of distinguishing
between legislative and nonlegislative rules. Part II sets forth the short cut
proposal, tracing its lineage back through the work of several prominent
administrative law scholars to a seminal 1987 dissent by then-Judge Kenneth
Starr. Part III demonstrates that courts have not adopted the short cut,
conducting a brief tour through current case law with an emphasis on cases in
which courts have confronted, either directly or indirectly, the logic of the
short cut and the trade-off.
Part IV of the Article attempts to explain this judicial reluctance. Section
IV.A argues that caution about the short cut is warranted in light of three
factors, all of which take aim at the trade-off argument that is so central to the
short cut's appeal. First, there are situations in which the trade-off relied upon
by advocates of the short cut would not take place." Second, the logic of the
trade-off stands in strong tension with the longstanding administrative law
principle that agencies are generally free to establish new policy through
adjudication as well as through rulemaking." Third, and most fundamental,
the trade-off is problematic even when it operates as its advocates intend,
because there are important differences between public scrutiny at the
promulgation stage and heightened judicial scrutiny at the enforcement stage."
Because of the differences between these two types of oversight, courts
adopting the short cut would often sacrifice the former without fully capturing
the benefits of the latter.
Finally, Section IV.B rejects the contention that the Mead decision lends
decisive force to the arguments in favor of the short cut, for three reasons.
First, even under Mead, nonlegislative rules might still qualify for heightened
deference under the Chevron doctrine." Second, even if the deference owed to
nonlegislative rules is diminished in theory after Mead, it is still often
substantial in practice, particularly in technically complex contexts." Third, an
agency's interpretation of its own rules, even when promulgated in the form of
a nonlegislative rule, continues to warrant an extremely lenient form of judicial
review.' 6 For all these reasons, it is unrealistic to derive assurance from Mead
n1. See infra text accompanying notes 161-182.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 183-209.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 210-223.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 226-235.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 236-240.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 241-248.
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that rules will receive more exacting judicial scrutiny simply because they were
promulgated without public input.
I. BACKGROUND: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND
NONLEGISLATIVE RULES
The APA adopts an extraordinarily broad definition of "rule": it is "the
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.""
The APA goes on to outline two techniques by which federal agencies may
make rules." The first technique, so-called "formal" rulemaking, involves
onerous trial-type hearings and is rarely required unless a specific statute calls
for rules to be "made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."
Far more common is the second technique, variously known as "informal,"
"notice-and-comment," or "section 553" rulemaking. Informal rulemaking, so
far as the APA's text reveals, is quite a barebones affair. The agency is required
to do only three things: issue a brief notice informing the public of "either the
terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved,"2 o give interested persons "an opportunity to participate in the
rule making through the submission of written data, views, or arguments,""
and ensure that any rules that are finally adopted are accompanied by "a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.""
In the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts of appeals-particularly the D.C.
Circuit-began supplementing these three basic steps by imposing additional
procedural requirements on agencies in cases governed by § 553 . In the 1978
17. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006). The definition is broad in more ways than one. For instance, the
phrase "general or particular applicability," if taken literally, would suggest that case-specific
orders also count as rules. Id. (emphasis added). This suggestion is put to rest, however, by
the APA's definitions of "order" as "the whole or part of a final disposition ... of an agency
in a matter other than rule making," id. § 551(6), and of "adjudication" as "agency process
for the formulation of an order," id. § 551(7).
18. Other, more specific statutory and regulatory provisions may supplement or supersede the
techniques set forth in the APA. Id. § 559.
ig. Id. §§ 553(c), 556, 557; see United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3).
21. Id. § 553(c).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., HBO, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491
F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C.




Vermont Yankee case, the Supreme Court not so politely told them to stop.'
The Court held that "generally speaking [§ 553] established the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures,"" adding that there was
"little doubt that Congress intended that the discretion of agencies and not that
of the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices should
be employed.""
In recent decades, however, Congress, the President, and the courts have all
taken steps that have made the notice-and-comment rulemaking process
increasingly cumbersome and unwieldy. 7 Congress has enacted statutes
requiring agencies to review proposed rules for their impacts on the
environment, small businesses, information collection, and state, local, and
tribal governments. 8 The White House, for its part, has required executive
branch agencies to submit major proposed rules to cost-benefit analysis and
centralized review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)." And
while Vermont Yankee put an end to explicit judge-made procedural
impositions, courts have continued to put meat on § 553's bones by demanding
that agencies demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking, respond to important
public comments, issue final rules that are a "logical outgrowth" of their
proposed rules, and generally take a "hard look" at significant objections and
alternatives to their chosen actions.3o As a result - and as anyone with
24. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
25. Id. at 524.
26. Id. at 546.
27. For a helpful chart assembling more than one hundred prerequisites to "informal"
rulemaking, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative
Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 533 (2000).
28. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. S§ 1531-38, 1571 (20o6); Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6o-12 (2oo6); Truth in Regulating Act of 2000, 5 U.S.C. §§
801-08 (20o6); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §5 4321-47 (20o6);
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21 (20o6).
29. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (requiring regulatory impact
analyses and OMB review); see Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999)
(requiring a "federalism summary impact statement" for certain rules); Exec. Order No.
12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988) (requiring analysis and record-keeping for rules affecting private
property).
30. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that
the agency had violated the APA by not disclosing studies relied upon by agency staff in
promulgating rule); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 901-o6 (D.C. Cir. 2oo6)
(interpreting § 553's requirements to mean that agencies must articulate the content and
basis of proposed legislative rules with enough detail to permit meaningful comment and
objections); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d
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experience in federal administrative practice can attest- completing a single
"informal" rulemaking can often take many years and consume a great deal of
agency and private resources.31 This development has come to be known as the
"ossification" of notice-and-comment rulemaking.32
Congressional committees, the White House, and academic commentators
have expressed concern that ossification has driven agencies increasingly to
avail themselves of the exemptions from notice-and-comment procedures
provided for in 5 553.3 This conventional wisdom is not universal: a recent
study concluded that agencies do not frequently use guidance documents
"strategically" to avoid the rulemaking process.34 This Article takes no position
on how often agencies act sincerely when they invoke exemptions from notice
and comment.3s Its objective, rather, is to argue that courts would be unwise to
1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); Am. Med. Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132-33 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (same); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3 d 1076, 1079-82
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the agency violated the APA because its final rule was not a
logical outgrowth of its proposed rule). For a discussion of "hard look" review, see infra text
accompanying notes 217-221.
31. For commentary criticizing this development, see, for example, Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); and Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossifv Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59 (1995). For
critiques of the critics, see, for example, William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does
Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory
Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393 (2000); and Mark Seidenfeld,
Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique ofJudicial Review, 70 OHIO ST.
L.J. 251 (2009).
32. Coinage of the term "ossification" has been credited to Donald Elliott. See McGarity, supra
note 31, at 1386 n.4 (citing E. Donald Elliott, Remarks at the Duke University School of Law
Symposium: Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty Years: Law,
Politics, and Economics (Nov. 15, 1990)).
33. See COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, 1o6TH CONG., NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF AGENCY
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. No. o6-1oo9, at 9 (2000) ("[A]gencies have sometimes
improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory notice-and-
comment requirements for agency rulemaking and establish new policy requirements.");
Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter Guidance Practices Bulletin] ("Because it is procedurally easier to issue
guidance documents, there also may be an incentive for regulators to issue guidance
documents in lieu of regulations."); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and
Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 159, 166 (2000) (asserting
that agencies are "avoiding 'ossification' ... by increased use of 'interpretative rules' and
'policy statements"').
34. Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119
YALE L.J. 782 (2010).





abandon entirely the project of distinguishing legislative from nonlegislative
rules in cases involving assertions of procedural invalidity.
Section 553 exempts from the notice-and-comment process rules involving
military and foreign affairs;,6 "matter[s] relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts";" "rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice"; interpretative rules and
general statements of policy;39 and rules as to which the agency has good cause
to conclude that notice and comment would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest." 4o In addition to being exempt from notice and
comment, these categories of rules tend to be unencumbered by the other
procedural requirements that have been imposed on the rulemaking process by
Congress, the executive, and the courts.4'
36. 5 U.S.C. 5 553(a)(1) (2006).
37. Id. § 553(a)(2).
38. Id. 5 553(b)(A).
3g. Id.
40. Id. § 553(b)(B).
41. See, e.g., Guidance Practices Bulletin, supra note 33, at 3432 (noting that guidance documents
are exempt from many procedures required for legislative rules); Raso, supra note 34, at 785
n.3 ("Guidance documents are exempt from executive orders and statutes governing the
issuance of legislative rules . . . ."). Some procedural requirements continue to apply to rules
that are exempt from notice and comment. For instance, any rule upon which an agency
relies when dealing with the public must be published in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. S
552(a)(1) (2006). In addition, in 2007 President George W. Bush for the first time mandated
OMB review of some nonlegislative rules. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763
(Jan. 18, 2007). Although this Executive Order was revoked in the early days of the Obama
Administration, see Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009), OMB has
indicated that it will continue to review significant guidance documents. See Memorandum
from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Exec. Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to
Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda-fy2009/mo9-13.pdf. In addition, the
OMB's Guidance Practices Bulletin requires notice and comment for any "economically
significant guidance document," defined as guidance that "may reasonably be anticipated to
lead to an annual effect on the economy of $1oo million or more or adversely affect in a
material way the economy or a sector of the economy." Guidance Practices Bulletin, supra
note 33, at 3439-40. Finally, Congress has required the FDA to solicit public input before
issuing guidance documents. FDA Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. S 371(h)(1) (20o6). But see
Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 401 (2007) ("With the exception of these FDA procedures, however, no other
statute requires procedures for agency guidance documents.").
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This Article focuses on the exemptions for "interpretive rules" and "general
statements of policy."" These two categories of exempt rules are often called
"guidance documents" or "nonlegislative rules," to distinguish them from
legally binding regulations, which are themselves often called "legislative
rules."4 Although the APA expressly exempts nonlegislative rules from notice
and comment, it does not define the category. The "working definitions" set
forth in the 1947 Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
say that legislative rules (the manual calls them "substantive rules") are "issued
by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and . . . implement the statute";
interpretive rules "advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes
and rules which it administers"; and general statements of policy "advise the
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a
discretionary power."4 These definitions, while helpful in fleshing out the
basic concepts, are of less help in resolving truly close cases. After all, virtually
any substantive rule can be said to "advise the public" of the agency's
interpretation of vague or ambiguous terms or the manner in which a
discretionary power will be exercised, and many nonlegislative rules are issued
"pursuant to statutory authority" in order to "implement [a] statute."
So courts have been left to struggle with the task of distinguishing
legislative from nonlegislative rules. The most difficult cases - the ones that the
short cut would eliminate altogether- arise when a party asserts that a
document promulgated without notice and comment is really a legislative rule
and is therefore procedurally invalid.4 1 Courts have described the tests that
42- 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). The APA uses the word "interpretative," but in keeping with most
other commentators I dispense with the extra syllable and use the word "interpretive."
43. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 41, at 399 ("Guidance documents can closely resemble
legislative rules, leading some to call them 'nonlegislative rules."'). This Article uses the
terms "guidance documents" and "nonlegislative rules" interchangeably.
44. TOM C. CIAlu, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947) [hereinafter 1947 MANUAL]. The Supreme
Court has often looked to the 1947 Manual for guidance in interpreting the APA. See, e.g.,
Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,
514 U.S. 122, 126-27 (1995); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n,31 (1979); Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978).
4s. Even the terminology has been the subject of some struggle. Robert Anthony has repeatedly
argued that the term "legislative rules" should be reserved for rules that have actually been
promulgated in accordance with statutory requirements, such as notice and comment, for
making rules that carry the force of law. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal
Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2ooo). In a limited terminological sense, then,
Anthony adopts the premise of the short cut: rules enacted with notice and comment are
legislative rules by definition, and that is that. In a more important sense, however, Anthony




govern these cases as "fuzzy,"4 "tenuous,"" "blurred,"*4 "baffling,"" and
"enshrouded in considerable smog.""o Distinguishing legislative rules from
interpretive rules has proven especially difficult." Various doctrinal tests have
been proposed: the "agency's label" test, which allows the agency to
characterize its rule however it wishes;" the "substantial impact" test, which
asks whether the challenged rule has a significant practical impact on the
regulated community;" and the "legal effect" test, which asks whether the
challenged rule creates new legal rights or duties as opposed to clarifying
calls "spurious rules," which have practical binding effect but were not promulgated
pursuant to legislative rulemaking procedures. Id. at 1048. Anthony recognizes, however,
that many courts continue to use the term "legislative rules" as this Article does: to describe
rules that are legally required to undergo statutory procedures such as notice and comment,
whether or not such procedures were actually used. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony,
"Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 1, 2-3 (1994).
46. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
47. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
48. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
49. Id.
so. Noel v. Chapman, 5o8 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975). These exemplary quotations are drawn
from Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 547, 547-48 (2000).
51. Pierce, supra note 5o.
52. See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381,
389-90 (proposing an "Agency's Label" test and collecting illustrative cases); see also
Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F. 3 d 1330, 1337 (1ith Cir. 2009) ("[A]1though not dispositive, the
agency's characterization of the rule is relevant . . . ."); SBC, Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 495
(3d Cir. 2005) ("[A]n agency's determination that 'its order is interpretative,' and therefore
not subject to notice and comment requirements, 'in itself is entitled to a significant degree
of deference."' (quoting Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 672 F.2d 1034, 1042 (2d Cir. 1982))). The
Supreme Court seemed to reject the agency's label test in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171-73 (2007), in which it concluded that a rule promulgated via notice
and comment was legally binding even though it was included in part of a document
entitled "Interpretations." Long Island Care at Home does not adopt the short cut, however:
the Court's reasons for concluding that the rule was legislative were not limited to the
presence of notice and comment. Id.
53. See, e.g., Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging that the court had previously used a substantial impact test to distinguish
between legislative rules and those rules exempt from notice-and-comment requirements);
Am. Transfer & Storage Co. v. ICC, 719 F.2d 1283, 1285 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that the
"relevant inquiry was . . . whether the rule will have a 'substantial impact' on those
regulated" (quoting Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir.
1979))); see also William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1325
(2001) (identifying "one line of cases [that] ha[s] looked at each claimed interpretive rule
and assessed whether it had a substantial impact on the regulated community").
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existing ones. 4 The legal effect test is currently the dominant approach among
the federal courts of appeals for distinguishing interpretive from legislative
rules," but it has proven difficult to apply consistently. 6 As for distinguishing
general statements of policy from legislative rules, courts tend to examine
whether the rule is binding, either on the public or on the agency. This
approach, too, has proven difficult for courts to apply. For one thing, the
degree to which a rule is binding may be hard to judge in the absence of a well-
developed record of enforcement.s For another, challenged rules often contain
disclaimers renouncing any binding effect. 9 Courts sometimes, however, hold
these rules to be legislative nonetheless, depending on other language in the
rule or the way in which the agency has invoked the rule in enforcement
actions or litigation.so
Despite their evident differences, all of these approaches to the
legislative/nonlegislative distinction have one thing in common: they require
54. See, e.g., Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9 th Cir. 2008) ("'[I]nterpretive
rules merely explain, but do not add to, the substantive law that already exists in the form of
a statute or legislative rule,' whereas legislative rules 'create rights, impose obligations, or
effect a change in existing law pursuant to authority delegated by Congress."' (quoting
Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087, (9th Cir. 2003))); Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d
1168, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a rule was interpretive because it did not have
the force and effect of law).
55. See Funk, supra note 53, at 1326 (stating that, in place of the substantial impact test, most
courts have adopted a legal effect test, which states that "if the questioned rule is legally
binding, it cannot be an interpretive rule").
s6. See Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L.J.
1497, 15o6 n.42 (1992) ("Given the intimate connection between interpretation and
policymaking in the administrative process, courts making this distinction can easily reach
unsatisfying, perhaps unprincipled, results."); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of
Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1383, 1435 (2004) ("Identifying the line between the
creation of a new norm and the interpretation of an existing norm is a notoriously difficult
enterprise and one that leaves a great deal of discretion in the hands of the court
characterizing the agency's announcement.").
57. See, e.g., Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3 d 1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Since the statement does
not cabin agency discretion .. . it has the characteristics of a policy statement.").
s8. See, e.g., Colwell v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 558 F. 3d 1112, 1128 ( 9th Cir. 2009)
(holding a pre-enforcement procedural challenge to a policy statement to be unripe); Pub.
Citizen, Inc., v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 940 F.2d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(same).
s. For a typical disclaimer, see 16 C.F.R. § 1.73 (2009) (presenting Federal Trade Commission
interpretations of Fair Credit Reporting Act). Id. ("The interpretations are not substantive
rules and do not have the force or effect of statutory provisions."). For a model disclaimer,
see Guidance Practices Bulletin, supra note 33, at 3437.




courts to divine the substantive nature of a rule - by examining its language,
purpose, or effect -in order to determine its procedural validity.
11. SLICING THROUGH THE SMOG? ENTER THE SHORT CUT
In a recent essay, Jacob Gersen proposes a simple way to resolve this
seemingly insoluble doctrinal dilemma: do away with it altogether.6' Gersen
argues that the traditional judicial inquiry should be turned on its head:
Rather than asking whether a rule is legislative to answer whether
notice and comment procedures should have been used, courts should
simply ask whether notice and comment procedures were used. If they
were, the rule should be deemed legislative and binding if otherwise
lawful. If they were not, the rule is nonlegislative. If the rule is
nonlegislative, a party may challenge the validity of the rule in any
subsequent enforcement proceeding; if the rule is legislative, the agency
may rely on the rule in a subsequent enforcement proceeding without
defending it.6 ,
As Gersen himself notes, 6  his "[m]odest [p]roposal"64 is only the latest
entry in a long and distinguished line of writings advocating what I have
dubbed the short cut.6 , John Manning, for instance, has also argued that courts
should get out of the business of trying to label rules as either legislative or
66
nonlegislative on their face.0 Manning argues that "reviewing courts can
effectively enforce [the] traditional distinction [between legislative and
61. Gersen, supra note lo, at 1705.
62. Id, at 1719. It is not clear whether Gersen's proposal would apply to agency pronouncements
classified by the agency as "general statements of policy" as well as to interpretive rules.
63. Id. at 1719 & n.83.
64. Id. at 1718.
65. 1 should make clear that I intend the term "short cut" not as a pejorative label but simply as
shorthand for the view that courts should get out of the business of setting aside
nonlegislative rules as procedurally invalid on the ground that they were really legislative
rules to begin with. It should go without saying that adherents of what I call the short cut
do not view their approach as an exercise in corner-cutting: they see it as a logical
concomitant of the principle that agencies have discretion as to their modes of proceeding,
and of the related notion that the legally binding effect of a rule should generally be a
function of the procedures that generated it rather than the other way around. Nonetheless,
from a judicial perspective, their approach would eliminate much of the befuddling
litigation over the true nature or purpose of rules asserted to be procedurally invalid. Hence
the term "short cut."
66. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 929 (2004).
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nonlegislative rules] simply by assigning different legal effects to an agency's
application of rules that are adopted without notice and comment." 6 Like
Gersen, Manning suggests that a rule adopted without notice and comment
should not by itself be relied upon by an agency to support a particular
adjudicative result, but he adds a twist, to which we shall return in Section
IV.A: an agency, says Manning, should be able to rely on a nonlegislative rule
to support an adjudicatory order if the rule is supported by sufficiently
thorough reasoning. 68 Before Manning, William Funk6' and Peter Strauss7o
also advanced arguments compatible with the short cut.7 1
Perhaps the most emphatic champion of the short cut is Donald Elliott,
former general counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Elliott
argues forcefully that administrative law proceeds from the premise that "an
agency's action is what it says it is.""7 Accordingly, if an agency labels one of its
pronouncements a general statement of policy -or, presumably, an interpretive
rule71-courts should treat it as such. To be sure, he adds,
67. Id. at 931.
68. Id. at 931-37. For discussion of this twist, see infra note 209.
69. Funk advocates
a simple test for whether a rule is a legislative rule or a nonlegislative rule: simply
whether it has gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking.. . . [I]f an agency
gives a nonlegislative rule binding legal effect, then the agency has acted
unlawfully, not because the nonlegislative rule was [a procedurally] invalid
legislative rule, but because the nonlegislative rule cannot have the legal effect the
agency accorded it.
Funk, supra note 53, at 1324-25; see also William Funk, When Is a "Rule" a Regulation?
Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REv.
659, 663 (2002) (restating this "simple test" and dubbing it the "notice-and-comment
test").
70. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1467-68 (1992). Strauss
stops short of advocating a pure short cut approach, arguing instead that courts should
generally be reluctant to impose burdensome procedural prerequisites on interpretive rules
and general statements of policy. (Strauss calls these "publication rules" because the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (20o6), requires them to be published in the
Federal Register before they may affect private parties. Id.) Like Manning, Strauss asserts
that these nonlegislative rules should be accorded a legal impact comparable to that of
agency adjudicatory precedent. Id. at 1472-73. See also infra note 209 (evaluating Strauss's
and Manning's proposals).
71. For more recent commentary proposing a version of the short cut, see Sam Kalen, The
Transformation of Modern Administrative Law: Changing Administrations and Environmental
Guidance Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 657, 694-95, 716 (2008).
72. Elliott, supra note 6, at 1490.
73. Elliott's article came in response to an article by Robert Anthony concerning the proper




[I]f an agency says initially that a policy statement is not a binding rule
and then later treats it as if it were a binding rule by refusing to engage
in genuine reconsideration of its contents in a subsequent case, a court
should invalidate the agency's action in the individual particular case on
the basis that the action lacks sufficient justification in the record."4
Elliott also provided the most vivid portrait of the trade-off at the heart of the
short cut proposal: his approach, he writes, would give the agency the same
choice faced by the automobile owner in the classic TV commercial in which a
"repairman intones ominously 'pay me now, or pay me later.'"" In other
words, says Elliott, the agency "can go through the procedural effort of making
a legislative rule now and avoid the burdens of case-by-case justification down
the road, or it can avoid the hassle of rulemaking now, but at the price of
having to engage in more extensive, case-by-case justification down the
road. 1176
We can trace the history of the short cut proposal back even earlier than
Elliott's work. The ur-text of the short cut movement is a partial dissent by
Judge Kenneth Starr in a 1987 D.C. Circuit case.77 The primary question
presented in the case was whether a pronouncement of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) establishing an "action level" for a contaminant in corn
called aflatoxin was procedurally invalid for failure to undergo notice and
comment.' The pronouncement, the panel majority held, bound the agency
not to take enforcement action against producers whose corn contained fewer
than twenty parts per billion of aflatoxin.79 As such, it was not a mere general
statement of policy; rather, it counted as a binding legislative rule and should
have been promulgated via notice and comment.o
discuss the interpretive rule category. But it is fair to assume that Elliott would apply the
same analysis to that category, and the D.C. Circuit has made that assumption. See Am.
Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 11o6, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(quoting Elliott's article in a case involving the definition of the "interpretive rule"
category).
74. Elliott, supra note 6, at 1491.
7S. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
78. Id. at 945.
79. Id. at 948 ("The agency's own words strongly suggest that action levels are not musings
about what the FDA might do in the future but rather that they set a precise level of
aflatoxin contamination that FDA has presently deemed permissible.").
so. Id. at 948-49.
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In dissent, Judge Starr contended that the court had erred by straying from
the straightforward "legal effect" test that he believed was embodied in circuit
precedent:
The correct measure of a pronouncement's force in subsequent
proceedings is a practical one: must the agency merely show that the
pronouncement has been violated or must the agency, if its hand is
called, show that the pronouncement itself is justified in light of the
underlying statute and the facts."
Judge Starr reasoned that the FDA's action level pronouncement would not
qualify as a legislative rule under this test, and therefore in a subsequent
enforcement proceeding the FDA would have to prove that the product was
"adulterated" within the meaning of the statute and could not rest on a
showing that the product's aflatoxin count exceeded twenty parts per billion.
While not expressly embracing the short cut, Judge Starr's analysis would lead
to the same outcome: rather than invalidate nonlegislative rules prospectively
as procedurally invalid, courts would simply deny them the force of law at the
enforcement stage." Judge Starr did recognize the potential danger that
agencies, confident that their pronouncements would receive deference when
eventually subjected to judicial review, would sidestep the inconvenience and
scrutiny that attends notice-and-comment rulemaking, but in the end he
dismissed this danger as "more theoretical than real" given Congress's power
to require agencies to proceed by legislative rule.84
Recently, some advocates of the short cut have argued that the danger to
which Judge Starr alluded has since been alleviated, if not eliminated
altogether, by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mead Corp.5
Jacob Gersen, in particular, places heavy reliance on Mead in his essay in
support of the short cut. In Mead, the Supreme Court vacated an informal tariff
81. Id. at 952 (Starr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id.
83. Judge Starr apparently did not fully embrace the short cut, as in a footnote he admitted that,
in his view, the FDA's action level pronouncement "comes tantalizingly close to a
substantive rule." Id. at 952 n.2.
84. Id. at 953.
85. 533 U.S. 218 (2001); see also Gersen, supra note lo, at 1720 (explaining that the concern "that
the agency could avoid scrutiny on the front end by issuing policy as an interpretive rule and
avoid scrutiny on the back end because of deference doctrine .. . is real, but its import has
been significantly lessened by developments in other areas of administrative law . .. [such




classification ruling issued by a regional office of the Customs Service.
Building on a rather casual passage in an earlier case,' the Court stated that the
expansive deference called for by its Chevron decision" is appropriate only
"when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."8 ' The
Court went on to specify that this prerequisite for Chevron deference would be
present when Congress "provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force."9 o It noted further that "the overwhelming
number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.""
Mead, in short, announced a presumption that nonlegislative rules would
not receive Chevron deference. Instead, the Court held, such rules should
presumptively receive the lesser and more malleable form of deference
elucidated by Justice Jackson in his opinion for the Court in Skidmore v. Swift &
Co. 9' According to that opinion, the deference owed to an agency interpretation
"will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.""
According to Gersen, Mead lends force to the short cut approach by
imposing a penalty on agencies that choose to forgo notice and comment: they
forfeit their entitlement to heightened deference on substantive judicial
review.9" Mead's presumptive denial of deference to nonlegislative rules
86. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
87. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.").
88. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
89. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
go. Id. at 230.
91. Id.
92. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
93. Id. at 140.
94. Gersen, supra note 1o, at 1720-21 ("[J]udicial deference is much more likely when agency
views are articulated using formal procedures like notice and comment. In the post-Mead
world, an agency may still use nonlegislative rules to issue policy. But the probability of
receiving judicial deference to views articulated in those rules falls substantially." (citation
omitted)); see also Manning, supra note 66, at 940 (arguing that Mead helps distinguish
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increases the costs of adopting such rules, the argument goes, thereby reducing
the risk that agencies operating under a short cut regime would dispense with
notice and comment when making important policy decisions."
III.THE SHORT CUT NOT TAKEN: EXPLORING THE CURRENT
JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE
In light of the short cut's obvious appeal, and the more than twenty years
of powerful advocacy marshaled on its behalf by a distinguished array of
scholars and judges, one would expect the proposal to have been embodied in
at least some judicial decisions. Yet the reality is quite the opposite. In short,
the short cut has not caught on. Instead, as noted briefly above,9' courts
continue to take the long road, attempting to draw distinctions between
legislative and nonlegislative rules based on substantive criteria such as
substantial impact, legal effect, and the agency's intent to bind itself and
others.
To gain a more complete view of the legislative/nonlegislative distinction in
action, it may be helpful to examine how courts apply the doctrinal tests that
they have developed to map that distinction. A few cases can serve to exemplify
not only the difficulties involved in applying those tests but also the reluctance
of courts to embrace the short cut. In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,97 for
instance, a group of electric power companies and chemical and petroleum
industry trade associations challenged the procedural validity of an EPA
guidance document that they argued imposed new "periodic monitoring"
requirements in connection with state-administered permit programs under
the Clean Air Act.' At the outset of its analysis, the D.C. Circuit expressed
severe skepticism about agencies' widespread use of guidance documents:
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a
broadly worded statute. The agency follows with regulations
legislative from nonlegislative rules by generally withholding Chevron deference from the
latter).
95. See Gersen, supra note io, at 1721 ("But for Mead, agencies might well make critical
interpretive choices using nonlegislative rules. But after Mead, this approach to policy is
implausible, or at least less attractive."); Manning, supra note 66, at 941 (suggesting that
after Mead, agencies have more incentive to "shift policymaking into notice-and-comment
procedures").
96. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
97. 208 F.3d oi5 (D.C. Cir. 2000).




containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards
and the like. Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars or guidance
or memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding
the commands in the regulations. One guidance document may yield
another and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may
spawn hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and more
detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law
is made, without notice and comment, without public participation,
and without publication in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal
Regulations."
This phenomenon, the court added, has been facilitated by the growth of the
Internet, which allows instant posting and dissemination of guidance
documents.' Agencies using guidance documents gain the benefit of
increased efficiency, said the court -and perhaps they also believe that they
thereby insulate their policies from judicial review.'0 '
Not so fast, the court held. Though labeled a nonfinal, nonbinding
document, the EPA's guidance on periodic monitoring "reads like a ukase. It
commands, it requires, it orders, it dictates.""o2 The court left little doubt about
its reasons for holding that the guidance-in light of its language, purpose, and
use by the agency -was a legislative rule:
If an agency acts as if a document issued at headquarters is controlling
in the field, if it treats the document in the same manner as it treats a
legislative rule, if it bases enforcement actions on the policies or
interpretations formulated in the document, if it leads private parties or
State permitting authorities to believe that it will declare permits
invalid unless they comply with the terms of the document, then the
agency's document is for all practical purposes "binding."0 3
The court vacated the guidance document in its entirety for failure to comply
with the notice-and-comment requirements of the Clean Air Act, 04 which
99. Id. at 1020.
oo. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1023.
103. Id. at 1021.
104. Id. at 1028.
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largely parallel those of the APA.'05 The alternative for the court, of course, was
the short cut, under which the court would simply have noted that the
guidance document - however it was worded, treated, or received - did not
undergo notice and comment and therefore could not be treated as legally
binding in any permit proceeding or other enforcement action.
A recent case in the Eleventh Circuit used comparable techniques to reach
an opposite result."o6 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA), administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), requires
"employers" to file financial reports disclosing all payments or loans they make
to labor unions.1 o7 In 2oo5, DOL published answers to "Frequently Asked
Questions" (FAQs) on its website saying that the category of employers
included "designated legal counsels" (DLCs) -lawyers recommended by
unions to their members for representation in personal injury lawsuits.o The
FAQs also stated that DOL's long-established de minimis exemption from the
reporting requirements applied to transactions totaling $250 or less in value,
the clear implication being that transactions above that amount would have to
be reported.' 9 Warshauer, a DLC, brought an action seeking to enjoin
enforcement of the policies expressed in the FAQs because of DOL's failure to
subject them to notice and comment."o After first upholding the challenged
policies as sufficiently consistent in substance with the text and general
purpose of the LMRDA,"' the Eleventh Circuit rejected Warshauer's
procedural challenge. The website advisory announcing that DLCs counted as
employers was exempt from notice and comment as an interpretive rule, not
only because it was labeled as such by the agency, but also because it was
"drawn directly from the plain language of the statute," and "'only reminded
affected parties of existing duties"' required by that language."' Nor could
Warshauer insist that he had relied to his detriment on a preexisting, contrary
agency interpretation, because any such earlier interpretation was not
sufficiently "well-established, definitive, and authoritative" to give rise to a
los. Compare Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 760 7(d) (20o6), with Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 5 553 (2oo6).
1o6. Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F-3d 1330 (1ith Cir. 2009).
107. Id. at 1332-33 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 433(a)(1) (code year omitted by the court)).
108. Id. at 1333-34.
iog. Id. at 1334.
lio. Id.
ill. Id. at 1335-36.
112. Id. at 1338. See generally id. at 1337-38 (explaining the basis for the court's finding that the




reliance interest."' As for the de minimis exemption, the fact that the website
advisory placed a numerical dollar figure on the exemption did not make it any
less interpretive."' Again, adoption of the short cut would have short-circuited
this entire discussion: the court would have summarily rejected Warshauer's
procedural challenge, perhaps taking a moment to remind the agency that it
could not rely on the website advisories as the basis for later enforcement
action.
Many similar examples could be offered. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has
held that an EPA directive in a press release stating that the agency would no
longer rely on third-party human studies in its regulatory decisionmaking was
a legislative rule because it "'binds private parties [and] the agency itself with
the force of law,"" that a Federal Communications Commission clarification
concerning compensation of pay phone companies for completed calls was a
legislative rule because it "change[d] the rules of the game,""' and that an EPA
guidance document concerning risk assessment techniques for disposal of toxic
chemicals was a legislative rule because it had practical binding effect."' The
same court has held that an EPA memorandum setting forth criteria for
reviewing state-submitted boundary designations for nonattainment areas
under the Clean Air Act was a general statement of policy because it was not
binding on the agency or private parties,"" that National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration guidelines covering regional recalls amounted to a policy
statement because they did not "establish new rights and obligations for
113. Id. at 1339.
114. Id. at 1340-41. On this numerical issue, Warshauer stands in contrast with Hoctor v. U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996), discussed at length by Gersen,
supra note io, in which Judge Posner held that a rule requiring eight-foot-high enclosures
for wild animals was legislative because there was no method that could reasonably be
described as interpretive "by which the Department of Agriculture could have excogitated
the eight-foot rule from the [pre-existing, generally worded] structural-strength
regulation." At the same time, Judge Posner conceded in Hoctor that not all numerically
precise regulations are for that reason legislative for APA purposes. Id. His concession is well
illustrated by American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F.2d
1io6 (D.C. Cit. 1993), in which the D.C. Circuit upheld as interpretive (and therefore
procedurally valid despite the agency's failure to perform notice and comment) an agency
policy letter stating that a numerically defined x-ray reading would count as a "diagnosis"
for purposes of federal mine safety reporting requirements.
15. Croplife Am. v. EPA, 329 F-3 d 876, 883 (D.C. Cit. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
116. Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 374 (D.C. Cit. 2003).
117. Gen. Elec. Co., 290 F.3d at 384-85.
118. Catawba Cnty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 33-35 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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automakers,""9 and that a Federal Aviation Administration letter concerning
rest time for crew members was an interpretive rule because it merely
"spell[ed] out a duty fairly encompassed within" an existing regulation. 20 In
the first group of cases, the challenged rule was vacated pre-enforcement for
failure to undergo notice-and-comment procedures. In the second group, the
procedural challenge failed because the pronouncement at issue was an exempt
interpretive rule or general statement of policy or because it was deemed
nonfinal agency action. But in all of them, the court reasoned from the
substantive purpose and effect of the rule to its required procedural
provenance, not the other way around. In short, in none of these cases was the
short cut anywhere to be found.
Although the short cut has been a no-show, it should be noted that the
basic logic of the trade-off- the idea that agencies ought to have wide latitude
to choose between public scrutiny at the promulgation stage and enhanced
judicial scrutiny at the enforcement stage-has made an occasional appearance
in the case law, particularly in the D.C. Circuit. The most prominent example
here is the 1993 American Mining Congress case, in which that court adopted the
"legal effect" test for distinguishing between legislative and interpretive
rules."' Writing for the court, Judge Stephen Williams began from the premise
that a rule is legislative "only if Congress has delegated legislative power to the
agency and if the agency intended to exercise that power in promulgating the
rule."'2 Judge Williams proceeded to itemize four situations in which it can be
said with some confidence that an agency intended to act with the force of law:
when, "in the absence of a legislative rule by the agency, the legislative basis for
agency enforcement would be inadequate,"'2 3 when an agency publishes a rule
in the Code of Federal Regulations,'" when an "agency has explicitly invoked
119. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 81o (D.C. Cir.
2006).
120. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, 291 F. 3d 49, 55-56 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis
removed) (quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)).
121. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1io6 (D.C. Cir. 1993). As for
whether a rule binds the agency in the sense that it does not leave the agency free to exercise
discretion in the future, the court explained that this factor was relevant to the distinction
between legislative rules and general statements of policy, not between legislative rules and
interpretive rules. Id. at iiii.
122. Id. at 1109.
123. Id.
124. Id. But see Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (describing
publication in the Code of Federal Regulations as not "anything more than a snippet of




its general legislative authority,"" and when a rule repudiates, amends, or is
irreconcilable with a prior legislative rule."'
Overall, American Mining Congress made it somewhat more difficult than it
had been previously in the D.C. Circuit to show that a rule was legislative as
opposed to interpretive. For instance, the court intimated that an APA
procedural challenge should succeed under the new test's first prong only
when the agency truly "needs to exercise legislative power."12 7 Explaining its
reluctance to define the exempt category of interpretive rules more narrowly,
the court invoked Elliott's "pay me now or pay me later" analogy:
A non-legislative rule's capacity to have a binding effect is limited in
practice by the fact that agency personnel at every level act under the
shadow of judicial review. . . . Because the threat of judicial review
provides a spur to the agency to pay attention to facts and arguments
submitted in derogation of any rule not supported by notice and
comment, even as late as the enforcement stage, any agency statement
not subjected to notice-and-comment rulemaking will be more
vulnerable to attack not only in court but also within the agency
itself."'
In short, because agencies will need to face the music at some point, there is
less need for robust judicial insistence upon notice and comment before
promulgation. This is, certainly, the logic of the trade-off. Still, there is a great
deal of difference between enhancing the availability of the interpretive rule
exception and jettisoning APA procedural review altogether in favor of the
short cut. No case, in the D.C. Circuit or outside of it, has expressly done the
latter.
Still, we ought to investigate the possibility that courts have in effect
adopted the short cut without saying so. Perhaps it is too much for short cut
proponents to ask judges to renounce explicitly their longstanding practice of
distinguishing legislative from nonlegislative rules. But if, as a matter of
practice, courts are routinely rejecting pre-enforcement assertions that
125. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112.
126. Id. at 11o9 (citing Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227,
235 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). More recently, the D.C. Circuit has articulated a similar test for
identifying legislative rules that turns on three factors: "(1) the Agency's own
characterization of the action; (2) whether the action was published in the Federal Register
or the Code of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether the action has binding effects on
private parties or on the agency." Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
127. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 111o.
128. Id. at 1111.
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particular rules are legislative in nature and must therefore undergo notice and
comment, then one of the essential functions of the short cut-preserving
agencies' methodological discretion -is already being served. And if the
judicial tests used to achieve this result are sufficiently emphatic and
predictable, then the short cut's other essential purpose-reducing litigation
costs-is being achieved as well. This state of affairs could prevail even if courts
in pre-enforcement actions made no explicit mention of the trade-off at the
heart of the short cut proposal, so long as they enforced that trade-off in
practice by refusing to allow agencies to predicate enforcement actions on rules
that were never subjected to notice and comment.
An examination of the case law reveals, however, that this state of affairs
does not in fact prevail. Courts have not adopted the short cut either openly or
sub rosa. It is true that some cases have held that the question of whether a rule
is legislative or nonlegislative is unripe for review at the pre-enforcement stage,
a disposition that could be viewed as consistent with the short cut."'
Occasionally, in such cases, the connection between a finding of unripeness
and the logic of the short cut is made explicit. 30 Most of these cases, however,
appear to involve claims by an agency that its rule was exempt from notice and
comment as a general statement of policy. The finding of unripeness in such
cases arises not from the logic of the short cut but from the notion that a rule's
true nature as a general statement of policy cannot be ascertained until a series
of enforcement actions has revealed whether the position expressed in the rule
was tentative or binding on the agency."' Devotees of the short cut would
forswear any examination of a rule's true nature, choosing instead to treat rules
as nonbinding on the merits if they never underwent notice and comment. In
short, declaring a challenge unripe is a far cry from holding that an agency has
absolute discretion to dispense with notice and comment, subject only to more
searching review at the enforcement stage.
129. See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. v. United States, 217 F.3 d 770, 780-85 (9 th Cir. 2000);
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F- 3d 1280, 1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Municipality of
Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1323-25 (9 th Cir. 1992); New Jersey v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., No. 07-4698, 2008 WL 4936933, at *11-13 (D.N.J. 2008).
130. See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 6o (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(finding that the challenge to a general statement of policy was unripe, and noting that
"[s]uch a characterization [as nonlegislative] comes at a price to the Commission; in
applying the policy, it will not be able simply to stand on its duty to follow its rules").
131. See, e.g., Colwell v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1128 (9th Cir. 2009);




Moreover, the prevailing view is that pre-enforcement APA notice-and-
comment challenges are indeed ripe for review."' While most such challenges
do not succeed on the merits, plenty do,"' and in any case the tests applied in
these cases could scarcely be called emphatic or predictable.
By the same token, although some courts have held that nonlegislative
rules do not constitute "final agency action"3 4 subject to judicial review under
the APA,'s this holding, as with ripeness, hardly applies across the board.', 6
Indeed, we have already seen an example to the contrary-the Appalachian
Power case discussed above."' In that case, the D.C. Circuit noted that the EPA
132. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh'g en bane granted in part,
opinion vacated in part, 599 F. 3d 652 (D.C. Cit. 2oo); Coal. for Common Sense in Gov't
Procurement v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 464 F.3d 1306, 1315-16 (Fed. Cit. 20o6). But see
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that statutory restrictions
and the ripeness doctrine "stand 'almost unyieldingly against pre-enforcement challenges to
Treasury's regulations promulgated in violation of APA procedural requirements"' (quoting
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy: Responding to Treasury's (Lack oJ) Compliance with
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1200
(2008))).
133. See, e.g., Military Order of the Purple Heart v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 580 F.3d 1293, 1297-
98 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that a new procedure for processing large claims was invalid
because it was contrary to existing regulations and was not implemented through notice-
and-comment rulemaking); Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(remanding to the FCC because it had failed to comply with notice-and-comment
requirements); Croplife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (vacating an EPA
press release because of the agency's "failure to engage in the requisite notice and comment
rulemaking"); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting
unripeness defense and vacating an EPA guidance document because of the agency's failure
to engage in notice and comment); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d lo5, 1023, 1028
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that guidance was final agency action, but setting it aside because
of the agency's failure to comply with notice and comment requirements imposed by the
Clean Air Act).
134. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (20o6).
135. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3 d 8, 13-17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that Fish and Wildlife Service and Department of Interior survey protocols concerning
endangered butterfly did not constitute final agency action); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. EPA,
225 F.3d 1144, 1147-49 (loth Cir. 2000) (holding that EPA opinion letters did not constitute
final agency action); Colo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 220 F.3d 1171 (ioth Cir.
2000) (holding that a Forest Service agreement addressing a state plan to introduce
Canadian lynx into Colorado was not final agency action); Taylor-Callahan-Coleman Cntys.
Dist. Adult Prob. Dep't v. Dole, 948 F.2d 953, 957-959 (Sth Cir. 1991) (holding that a letter
from the Administrator of Wage and Hour Division was not final agency action).
136, For a discussion of the conflicting case law on finality and agency guidance documents, see
generally Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: Rethinking the
Finality Doctrine, 6o ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 407 (20o8).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105.
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guidance document stated, "The policies set forth in this paper are intended
solely as guidance, do not represent final Agency action, and cannot be relied
upon to create any rights enforceable by any party.""' The court went on to
emphasize that this was a boilerplate disclaimer, inserted at the end of every
guidance document issued by the EPA since 1991,"' and had no difficulty
rejecting it as nothing more than a "charade."o4 0 The guidance document, the
court held, was final because it was practically binding, and was therefore
subject to pre-enforcement review.'4 ' Again, as with the ripeness cases, even
those courts that have deemed nonlegislative rules to be nonfinal have not
come close to embracing the short cut. 42
Finally, it might be asked what practical difference it makes for a court to
vacate an agency's pronouncement on grounds of procedural invalidity as
opposed to denying pre-enforcement review altogether on the understanding
that the pronouncement will lack legal binding force in any later enforcement
proceeding. In some instances, to be sure, the difference might be small-
under current doctrine, the agency might respond to a vacatur by simply
reissuing the pronouncement with a stronger disclaimer explaining that it
really, truly is not binding.44 But in many instances, the difference will be
great. For one thing, the agency might decide not to reissue the
pronouncement or might decide to submit the relevant policy decision to
notice and comment. More importantly, however, vacatur gives the agency
(and other agencies) greater incentive to submit comparable pronouncements
to notice and comment in the future. As will be discussed below, courts are,
138. Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023.
139. Id. at 1023 (citing Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like -Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J.
1311, 1361 (1992)).
140. Id. (quoting Strauss, supra note 70, at 1485).
141. Id. at 1020, 1023.
142. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 8o8
(D.C. Cit. 2oo6) (finding agency guidelines not to be final agency action or legislative rules
because they "do not determine any rights or obligations, nor do they have any legal
consequences"); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F-3d 8, 15-17 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that agency letters
were not binding and that they did not constitute final agency action); Taylor-Callahan-
Coleman Cntys. Dist. Adult Prob. Dep't v. Dole, 948 F.2d 953, 957-59 (5th Cir. 1991)
(determining that opinion letters were not final agency action by examining the effect of the
letters on the regulated entity and the scope of the letters).
143. See, e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F. 3 d 207, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting
that the EPA had responded to the Appalachian Power decision by adding additional




and should be, careful not to be too aggressive in policing procedural validity,
lest they drive agencies out of rulemaking and into purely ad hoc adjudicatory
mechanisms.'" But that aspect of current doctrine only reinforces the present
conclusion: administrative law is far from embracing the short cut, both as a
legal and a practical matter.
IV.THE PERILS OF THE SHORT CUT: IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
SKEPTICISM
It remains for us to determine why the short cut has not caught on-why,
as William Funk wistfully admits, "the courts have not adopted this simple and
accurate test."4 s This Part of the Article does that, but it aims to do more: it
seeks not only to discover why courts have been reluctant to embrace the short
cut, but also to explain why their reluctance has been warranted. In order to do
so, however, we must first examine the costs and benefits associated with
agencies' use of guidance documents and other forms of nonlegislative
rulemaking. Once we understand these costs and benefits, we can assess the
central claim made by advocates of the short cut: that it allows agencies, courts,
and the public to reap the benefits of nonlegislative rulemaking while avoiding
most, if not all, of its costs.
The use of nonlegislative rules generates three fundamental benefits for
agencies and the regulated public. First, it provides relatively swift and accurate
notice to the public of how the agency interprets the statutes or rules that it
administers and how it intends to carry out its statutory mandate.146 in
particular, the use of interpretive rules allows agencies to clarify their
144. See infra text accompanying notes 156-157.
145. Funk, supra note 53, at 1325. Stare decisis is not a sufficient explanation for the reluctance of
courts to embrace the short cut. For one thing, the Supreme Court has not spoken with any
clarity about the basis for distinguishing legislative from nonlegislative rules, so all thirteen
federal circuits have been free to carve their own paths. For another, the relevant case law
within the circuits has been, to say the least, sufficiently unstable and protean that a court of
appeals could adopt the short cut without undue violence to the already ragged fabric of the
law. For citations to changing circuit precedent, see supra notes 52-6o.
146. Id. at 1323 (explaining that nonlegislative rules allow "an agency to communicate its views
on the law and policy to the public, especially the regulated public, on a timely basis, so that
they will not be surprised by agency action"); Kalen, supra note 71, at 673 (asserting benefits
to the public from technical guidance documents); Pierce, supra note 31, at 82-83 (explaining
that interpretive rules "provide affected members of the public and their elected
representatives a valuable source of information with respect to the policies agencies are
attempting to pursue"); Strauss, supra note 70, at 1481 ("By informing the public how the
agency intends to carry out an otherwise discretionary task, publication rulemaking permits
important efficiencies to those who must deal with government.").
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understanding of ambiguous statutes or rules without initiating a new round
of notice and comment.14' As Nina Mendelson notes, agencies could use
legislative rules for this purpose, but this route would be time-consuming and
might expose the agency to subsequent lawsuits alleging noncompliance with
the rule.' 4 Second, nonlegislative rulemaking allows agency heads to inform
lower-level employees promptly about changes in agency policy (through such
means as staff manuals, guidance documents, advice letters, and the like) in
order to ensure bureaucratic uniformity and regularity.149 Third, nonlegislative
rules avoid opportunity costs by freeing up agencies to redirect resources-
resources that would otherwise be expended in the cumbersome process of
notice-and-comment rulemaking- toward potentially more important
priorities."o
All three of these primary benefits of nonlegislative rulemaking sound in
concerns about administrative efficiency. (And of course, the short cut itself is
justified as a judicial doctrine primarily in terms of adjudicatory economy:
reducing decision costs by eliminating expensive litigation over the nature or
purpose of particular rules.)"' The cost side of the ledger, by contrast, is
147. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 66, at 914 (noting that interpretive rules such as staff manuals
and guidance documents "avoid (increasingly) cumbersome notice-and-comment
procedures"); Mendelson, supra note 41, at 410 (noting that an agency issuing guidance
documents can decide how much information to disclose and "is not obligated to respond to
comments or to supply the 'concise statement of their basis and purpose"' (quoting s U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (2000))).
148. Mendelson, supra note 41, at 409.
149. See, e.g., Kalen, supra note 71, at 671 ("Absent such [nonlegislative] documents, agency
personnel could interpret or apply a particular regulation or statute inconsistently in various
regional or field offices."); Manning, supra note 66, at 914-15 ("[N]onlegislative rules
potentially allow agencies to supply often far-flung staffs with needed direction . . . .");
Mendelson, supra note 41, at 409 ("Agencies rely on handbooks, directives, and other similar
guidance documents to ensure that lower-level employees complete forms correctly and
make consistent (and thus more predictable) decisions."); Strauss, supra note 70, at 1482
("Staff instructions, manuals, and other forms of publication rules are essential tools of
bureaucratic management, by which the expertise of an agency is shared throughout its
structure, and staff operatives are kept under the discipline necessary to the efficient
accomplishment of agency mission.").
iso. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 66, at 914 (explaining that interpretive rules "represent a
relatively low-cost and flexible way for agencies to articulate their positions"); Pierce, supra
note 31, at 83 (agencies are "free to issue, amend, or rescind all [interpretive] rules quickly,
inexpensively, and without following any statutorily prescribed procedures"); Strauss, supra
note 70, at 1472 (legislative rules are "expensive to [agencies'] limited resources and so
conducive to frustrating their choices about how to use those resources").
151. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note lo, at 1715; Strauss, supra note 70, at 1478 n.44 (noting that any




dominated by concerns about broad public participation. The use of
nonlegislative rules comes at a serious cost from the standpoint of
participation, because it enables agencies to make major policy decisions
without observing the formal processes that Congress crafted to facilitate
meaningful public input, commentary, and objection.' Often these policy
decisions in effect command compliance from regulated industries and thus
have substantial practical effects on the public, regardless of whether they are
framed as mere guidances, interpretations, or tentative policy statements.' It
would seem inconsistent with both legislative intent and democratic theory to
allow agencies to make such decisions without public input whenever they
wish."4
rules that merely interpret existing obligations "can have the qualities of a shell game[,
because] authorized interpretation frequently supplies judgments no one would pretend the
enacting body considered" and citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), as an example).
152. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief, 72 Mo. L. REv. 695, 735 (2007)
("[I]ncreased public participation in agency decisionmaking is more democratic and
increases the legitimacy of agency decisions and public trust in the agencies.") (footnote
omitted); Mendelson, supra note 41, at 424-25; Pierce, supra note 31, at 85-86.
153. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F. 3 d 377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that if a
nonlegislative rule "is such that private parties can rely on it as a norm or safe harbor by
which to shape their actions, it can be binding as a practical matter" (quoting Anthony,
supra note 139, at 1328-29)); Guidance Practices Bulletin, supra note 33, at 3435 ("[A]lthough
guidance may not be legally binding, .. . [it] can have coercive effects or lead parties to alter
their conduct."); Anthony, supra note 139, at 1328 ("A document will have practical binding
effect before it is actually applied if the affected private parties are reasonably led to believe
that failure to conform will bring adverse consequences, such as an enforcement action or
denial of an application."); Magill, supra note 56, at 1397 ("[E]ven when the agency acts in
an advisory capacity, its views have unquestionable real-world consequences."); Mendelson,
supra note 41, at 407 ("[G]uidance documents often have rule-like effects on regulated
entities. Regulated entities often comply with the policies announced in guidance
documents, thereby alleviating the agency's burden of enforcement."); Strauss, supra note
70, at 1465 (noting that citizens can be bound when, "as a practical matter, citizens have few
choices but to follow policies the government has announced").
154. It is true that the White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a
Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices in 2007 directing agencies to accept comments
before issuing "significant" guidance documents. See Guidance Practices Bulletin, supra note
33. But the effect of the bulletin is unlikely to be significant for several reasons. It does not
obligate agencies to respond to the comments they receive; agencies that violate it are
accountable only to OMB, not in court; and, outside the relatively narrow category of
"economically significant guidance documents," an agency can comply without casting the
net broadly, seeking comments only from a small group of regulated entities with which it
has an well-established relationship. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the OMB
bulletin, with particular reference to the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, see Mendelson,
supra note 41, at 447-50.
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By the same token, however, there is good reason not to insist that all
agency policymaking take place via notice and comment. Currently, agencies
issue a far greater number of nonlegislative rules than legislative ones.'s If
courts construed the legislative rule category broadly, so that agencies were
required to go through the arduous process of notice-and-comment
rulemaking in order to promulgate a substantial portion of their policies,
agencies might respond by not making rules at all. Current doctrine permits
this: the Supreme Court has held that the decision whether to craft policy via
rulemaking or case-by-case adjudication lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the agency."' This aspect of current doctrine cautions against
construing statutory exemptions from notice and comment too
parsimoniously. If policymaking by rule becomes sufficiently costly, then
agencies will shift to purely adjudicatory mechanisms -sacrificing in the
process all of the potential benefits of the rulemaking mode, such as clear
notice and broad public participation. As Judge Williams put it in his American
Mining Congress opinion:
The protection that Congress sought to secure by requiring notice and
comment for legislative rules is not advanced by reading the exemption
for "interpretive rule" so narrowly as to drive agencies into pure ad
hocery-an ad hocery, moreover, that affords less notice, or less
convenient notice, to affected parties.'
To put matters simply, one of the benefits of nonlegislative rulemaking, at least
in contexts where notice and clarity are especially important, is that it is not
pure adjudication.
The legislative versus nonlegislative rule debate thus poses a pragmatic
challenge: how can courts strike the best balance between administrative
efficiency and broad public participation in agency policymaking? Interpret the
exemptions from notice and comment too narrowly, and you drive agencies
155. See Johnson, supra note 152, at 695 n.s ("In many agencies, more than ninety percent of the
'rules' are adopted through policy statements and interpretive rulemaking."); Strauss, supra
note 70, at 1469 (noting that nonlegislative rules occupy many times more library shelf
space than legislative ones).
156. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-94 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). For further discussion of the "Chenery II principle" as it relates
to nonlegislative rulemaking, see infra text accompanying notes 183-209.
iS7. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d nio6, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
see also Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7 th Cir. 1996) ("It would be no
favor to the public to discourage the announcement of agencies' interpretations by




into a purely adjudicative mode that offers less notice and less opportunity for
widespread participation." Interpret them too broadly, and you allow agencies
to dispense with public input at the pre-promulgation stage as a matter of
course. Some sort of middle path seems best.
The advocates of the short cut acknowledge this pragmatic concern.
Indeed, all of them seem to recognize that an interpretation of the APA that
resulted in wholesale abandonment of notice and comment by agencies would
be unacceptable."' This is why they place so much emphasis on what I have
called the trade-off argument. Recall the argument: as long as agencies know
that they must submit their rules to meaningful scrutiny sooner or later, they
will not abuse the discretion that the short cut gives them. Rather, agencies will
choose, at least in some circumstances, to submit their proposed rules to public
input via notice and comment in order to avoid increased judicial scrutiny at
the enforcement stage. If this trade-off argument is persuasive, then the failure
of courts to embrace the short cut is truly difficult to justify."'o As the next
section shows, however, the trade-off argument fails, for three reasons.
158. Even when standing to intervene is generously awarded, see, for example, Office of Commc'n
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), adjudication does not
provide as broad a framework for public participation as the APA's "interested persons"
standard, 5 U.S.C. 5 553(c) (2006).
159. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 1o, at 1721; Manning, supra note 66, at 945. Elliott may be an
exception here, because he discounts the benefits of notice and comment quite substantially.
See infra text accompanying notes 213-215.
i6o. One might try to argue that the short cut is unsound as a matter of statutory interpretation
because 5 553 of the APA contemplates that some kinds of rules simply must undergo notice
and comment, while others (for example, "interpretative rules" and "general statements of
policy," 5 U.S.C. 5 553(b) (A)) are exempt. That statement is true, but it does not preclude
the short cut. After all, nothing in the APA says that courts rather than agencies should
determine which rules are exempt. The fact that pre-enforcement judicial review did not
become a reality until more than twenty years after the enactment of the APA, see Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), argues against the notion that Congress expected
courts to sort procedurally valid from procedurally invalid rules based on their text or
context. So does the principle, emphasized by John Manning, that agencies have virtually
unreviewable discretion in their choice of policymaking mode -a principle that predates the
APA. See Manning, supra note 66, at 901-14. In short, the APA's text and history are fully
consistent with the view that notice-and-comment procedures create a kind of procedural
safe harbor, to be entered at the agency's option, which allows the resulting rule to be
treated as legally binding. The objective of this Article is to show that such a view is
pragmatically undesirable, not that it is textually untenable.
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A. Casting Doubt on the Trade-Qff
First, the trade-off, while perhaps attractive in theory, would not always
happen in practice. Indeed, the short cut-understood as a mechanism that
treats the notice-and-comment process as a necessary and sufficient means of
generating legally binding rules in accordance with the APA-would
sometimes misfire in both directions, yielding both false negatives and false
positives. The false negatives (cases in which the short cut would deny binding
legal effect to rules properly understood as legislative) could theoretically occur
in the context of rules such as those dealing with foreign or military affairs or
agency practice and procedure-which are plainly entitled to the force of law
under the APA, notwithstanding the absence of notice and comment."' To be
fair, this outcome would seem unlikely, so long as courts supplemented the
short cut with a sensitive understanding of § 553's subject-matter exemptions.
A more serious concern is the risk of false positives-cases in which the short
cut would grant binding legal effect to rules properly understood as
nonlegislative. Agencies often conduct some version of notice and comment
even when they do not intend the resulting statement of policy to be legally
binding.1' They might do so voluntarily in order to make a well-informed yet
tentative decision, or because the policy statement in question qualifies as an
"economically significant guidance document" under the OMB's bulletin on
good guidance practices, in which case the agency must invite public comment
at the draft stage.' A court that automatically equated notice and comment
with binding legal effect would misclassify such policy statements as legislative
rules, thereby denying the agency the discretion to depart in individual cases
from a position that it had viewed as tentative. Worse still, such a classification
would require the agency to initiate a full rulemaking proceeding to change its
policy-a price that might chill agencies from voluntarily seeking public input
in the first place.
But there is a deeper and more telling reason why the trade-off will often
fail to take place. When an agency pronouncement sets forth the conditions
161. See supra notes 36-40 (citing categories of exempt rules).
162. See, e.g., Hudson v. FAA, 192 F. 3 d 1031, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Peter L. Strauss,
Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element,
53 ADMIN. L. REv. 803, 821 (2001) (asserting on the basis of his own experience that agencies
often solicit public comment before adopting nonlegislative rules). The Administrative
Conference of the United States recommended pre-adoption notice and comment for
nonlegislative rules "likely to have substantial impact on the public." 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5
(1992).




under which the agency will not take action-because the pronouncement
either sets minimum criteria for triggering enforcement mechanisms or
announces a general deregulatory policy or interpretation- there will usually
be no later enforcement action in which the agency's views can be tested. In the
case of such threshold or permissive rules, the short cut would guarantee
neither public input at the promulgation stage nor judicial review at some later
stage. Yet such rules can have substantial practical effects on regulated entities
and, in particular, on the intended beneficiaries of regulation.
A good illustration here is Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 164 the
case in which Judge Starr's partial dissent first gave shape to the short cut
proposal. Recall that in Community Nutrition Institute the D.C. Circuit vacated
as procedurally invalid a pronouncement by the FDA setting an "action level"
for aflatoxin at twenty parts per billion.165 Although Judge Starr suggested that
the appropriate judicial course was to wait until the FDA acted on its
pronouncement, that solution would have offered no judicial redress to groups
like the Community Nutrition Institute that believed the agency was failing to
carry out its statutory mandate. After all, the FDA could "act on" its action level
pronouncement only by declining to take enforcement action against producers
whose corn contained less than twenty parts per billion of aflatoxin-but
decisions by an agency not to take enforcement action are generally
unreviewable.166 In effect, then, the panel majority in Community Nutrition
Institute held that an agency's wholesale nonenforcement decision was
reviewable even though-indeed, to some extent because-its retail
nonenforcement decisions would be unreviewable.
The Community Nutrition Institute case does not stand alone. As Robert
Anthony detailed some years ago, agencies often use nonlegislative rules to
create "safe-harbor polic[ies]" alerting regulated parties that they will not be
deemed in violation if they comply.,'6 Such policies may or may not specify
whether enforcement action will be taken against noncomplying parties, but in
any case they create practically binding norms whenever, as will often be the
case, noncompliance is not a realistic option."' Thus, for example, in Chamber
of Commerce v. U.S. Department of Labor, 6 , the D.C. Circuit set aside as
procedurally invalid a directive from the Occupational Safety and Health
164. 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)-
165. Id. at 945.
166. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
167. Anthony, supra note 139, at 1339.
168. Id.
169. 174 F.3 d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Administration promising not to inspect workplaces as frequently or
thoroughly if the employer complied with certain newly articulated safety
standards. The court reasoned that the burdens associated with inspections
were so great that employers had no real choice but to take steps to avoid them,
and that the directive was therefore practically binding.o17  The practical
binding effect of such policies is particularly potent when the agency plays a
gatekeeper role, granting or withholding permits or licenses that are essential
to the livelihood or business survival of an applicant. 7 ' Thus, in an early
nonlegislative rule case, the D.C. Circuit vacated a pronouncement issued by
the Interstate Commerce Commission without notice and comment that
loosened restrictions on motor carriers seeking permission to transport people
and goods in and out of Canada, on the grounds that the pronouncement
effectively established a "flat rule of eligibility.""'
These examples call attention to a broader point. Doctrines such as
standing, finality, ripeness, and nonreviewability of agency inaction combine to
make it very difficult to obtain judicial review of permissive, deregulatory, or
threshold-setting agency pronouncements. 3 As Nina Mendelson has pointed
out, obtaining access to judicial review of such agency actions is especially
difficult for regulatory beneficiaries -the diffuse and decentralized groups such
as consumers, employees, or users of public lands who benefit when rules are
enforced against others."' If such groups are unable to participate in the
process of shaping and critiquing agency policy ex ante -because the agency
has sidestepped notice and comment under a short cut regime -they may never
get a bite at the apple ex post.' The result of the short cut, then, could be a
regulatory scheme with a greater bias toward prominent regulated entities and
170. See id. at 211-13.
171. See, e.g., Raso, supra note 34, at 803 (noting that agencies with "gatekeeping power," such as
the FDA and FCC, can more readily induce voluntary compliance).
172. Am. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United States
ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1977)).
173. See, e.g., Colwell v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 558 F-3d 1112, 1128 (9 th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a pre-enforcement challenge to HHS guidance was not ripe unless and until
challengers could provide an example "of the manner in which the HHS has used the Policy
Guidance -as, for example, in an enforcement proceeding against one of them"); see also
Mendelson, supra note 41, at 411 (noting finality and ripeness barriers to judicial review of
guidance documents).
174. See id. at 420-24.
175. See id. at 424-33; cf Strauss, supra note 162, at 817 ("[T]hose who are the objects of
regulation may welcome a publication rule, that members of the public believe [to be]
inadequately protective of their interests; again, because the regulated will comply, there




other repeat players who have both informal access to agency decisionmakers at
the policymaking stage"' and a greater likelihood of obtaining judicial review
at the enforcement stage.177 To be sure, courts should be mindful not to
overenforce norms of procedural formality because of the danger that agencies
would be driven to greater use of ad hoc adjudication.17 Safe harbors are
helpful, after all. 17  But the asymmetrical effect of standard-setting
nonlegislative rules on regulatory beneficiaries provides a powerful reason to
resist the short cut, which calls upon courts to abandon pre-enforcement
procedural review of such rules altogether.
If permissive or threshold-setting rules were the only context in which we
could reliably predict that the trade-off would not take place, the remedy
would be simple - apply the short cut but make an exception for these types of
rules. This, however, is not the case: even in instances where agencies issue
"traditional" nonlegislative rules concerning positive criteria for enforcement
action, the trade-off often fails to take place. This is because many regulated
entities choose, as a practical matter, to comply with nonlegislative rules rather
than incur the expense and uncertainty associated with pre-enforcement
challenges or the risks associated with noncompliance.so As Peter Strauss
notes, although regulated entities may theoretically retain the option of
challenging the substantive validity of nonlegislative rules during licensing,
ratemaking, or other enforcement proceedings, "[i] n practice .. . these options
entail risks and impose costs that many will be unwilling or even unable to
accept.",,8' The risks of noncompliance might decrease somewhat under a short
176. See Mendelson, supra note 41, at 429 (noting that agencies tend to reach out to known
regulated entities "as a sounding board for policy development" and to maintain good long-
term relationships).
177. To be sure, even under current doctrine, deregulatory or threshold-setting rules are
sometimes treated as nonlegislative, see, e.g., Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F-3d 1330 (ith Cir.
2009) -or, more questionably, not as rules at all, see Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494
F.3d 1027, 1031-34 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding EPA's agreement not to take enforcement
action against animal feeding operations to be an unreviewable exercise of enforcement
discretion rather than a rule). But the short cut would go much further by precluding all
procedural review of such rules.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 155-157.
179. See Strauss, supra note 162, at 814.
iso. See Anthony, supra note 139, at 1328; Pierce, supra note 31, at 90-91 (explaining that unless
the probability of judicial invalidation of a rule is significant, a regulated party will likely
comply with a rule when the cost of compliance is less than the cost of noncompliance).
181. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 70, at 1476; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals To Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75
TEX. L. REv. 483, 489 (1997) ("[B]y using policy statements to coerce compliance with a
desired standard, an agency can circumvent the safeguards the three branches of
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cut regime (if enforcement actions became more vulnerable to successful
challenge because nonlegislative rules lacked the force of law), but there is no
reason to believe that they would drop to zero -and good reason to doubt that
they would drop substantially.'8' The trade-off, simply put, makes more sense
in theory than in practice.
Second, the trade-off, even when it did occur, would not significantly
constrain agencies' ex ante incentives. Recall that under current doctrine,
agencies are generally free to develop new policy through adjudication. 8,
Though often criticized, 14 this so-called "Chenery II principle" has been
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court on several occasions.'s Under current law,
therefore, an agency can develop and impose a new interpretation of its
enabling statute or its existing regulations during the enforcement process
itself. This interpretation is, of course, subject to judicial review at the behest of
the party against whom enforcement action has been brought. 1 6 But,
assuming the agency proceeded via formal adjudication, the interpretation will
be upheld in court so long as it is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute or regulation, 17 and the resulting order may be cited by the agency in
enforcement actions against similarly situated entities. 88
To be sure, agency adjudicative precedents are formally binding only on the
parties to the adjudication in which they were announced, and parties in
subsequent actions are not precluded from challenging their factual or legal
government have developed to ensure that the agency's policy is legally, economically, and
politically justified.").
182. See infra Section IV.B (questioning the proposition that deference doctrines would produce
substantial incentives for agencies to opt for notice and comment under a short cut regime).
183. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
184. For what is still the most trenchant criticism of the principle, see Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 216-
18 Jackson, J., dissenting). For a more recent critique of Chenery II, on the grounds that it is
inconsistent with other aspects of modern administrative law, see Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 461, 535-36 (2003).
185. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96-97 (1995); NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
186. That is, if the targeted entity chooses to challenge the enforcement action, which is not a
sure thing. See supra text accompanying notes 18i-i88.
187. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001) (noting that formal
adjudications are entitled to Chevron deference).
188. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 (1969) (plurality opinion) ("Subject to





predicates both before the agency and in court.' 9 Thus, an agency must be
prepared to support the validity of its precedent, and a precedential "rule"
grounded in the adjudicative facts of a particular case may not be applied to a
new case whose facts are materially different.' Nonetheless, as a practical
matter, agencies frequently advance important policy objectives via
adjudication, and if the resulting precedent is based on broadly applicable
legislative facts and is upheld on judicial review, it will prove very difficult for
subsequent parties to dislodge.' 9 ' Short cut proponents therefore overstate the
costs to agencies of being unable to "rely" on nonlegislative rules because
agencies can generally advance the very same interpretation as part of their
reasoning in support of an enforcement action without reducing it to any sort
of rule. Vhen this is so, the trade-off does not achieve a great deal, for it
merely exacts from agencies as the price of doing without notice and comment
something that they did not need in the first place.
A couple of examples may help flesh out the point. In Shalala v. Guernsey
Memorial Hospital (Guernsey),"' a hospital sought Medicare reimbursement for
losses associated with a refinancing of its bonded debt. In accordance with an
informal reimbursement guideline, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Secretary) determined that the losses had to be amortized over the life
of the hospital's old bonds.'9 The hospital argued that the reimbursement
guideline effected a substantive change in the existing regulatory framework by
189. I am grateful to Ron Levin for emphasizing this point in communications with me. His
article, Levin, supra note 56, at 1501-02, contains a useful discussion of the nonbinding
nature of agency precedent, from which the examples in the next footnote are drawn.
190. See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en
banc); Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 707 F.2d 230, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. St. Francis
Hosp. of Lynwood, 6oi F.2d 404, 414-16 (9 th Cir. 1979).
191. It should be mentioned that agency staff and attorneys sometimes overpress by treating
adjudicative precedent as though it were formally binding-just as they sometimes commit
the same error with respect to nonlegislative rules. See, e.g., McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v.
Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that because the EPA had refused to
entertain objections to its policy, that policy was functioning as a legislative rule; and that,
on remand, the agency must initiate notice and comment or stand ready to entertain
objections to the policy); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cit. 1974)
("When the agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to
support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued."); Strauss, supra
note 162, at 816 ("A bit more care from agency counsel about the precise source of authority
an agency is claiming ... could work wonders.").
192. 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
193. Id. at 90. The Secretary conceded that the guideline was not a legislative rule, so the Court
had no occasion to address the baffling question of how to distinguish between legislative
and nonlegislative rules.
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departing from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and was void
for failure to undergo notice and comment.'9 4 The Supreme Court disagreed in
a 5-4 decision. The Court held that the existing regulations did not require the
Secretary to follow GAAP."I Most pertinent for present purposes, however, the
Court held that the Secretary was entitled to proceed via a combination of
adjudication and interpretive rulemaking.'9' The reimbursement guideline
represented a reasonable interpretation of existing law, not a substantive
change to it. As such, it could be given effect as part of an enforcement action:
"The APA does not require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by
further, more precise rules rather than by adjudication." 9 7
Take another example: in United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc.,19 the federal
government brought an action against a movie theater owner, Cinemark, for
allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act."' Specifically, the
government claimed that Cinemark had failed to comply with a Department of
Justice (DOJ) regulation mandating that "[w]heelchair areas ... shall be provided
so as to provide people with disabilities . . . lines of sight comparable to those for
members of the general public."20 The regulation was promulgated pursuant to
notice and comment, but Cinemark argued that the enforcement action was
based on DOJ's understanding that its regulation required wheelchair-using
patrons to enjoy lines of sight that were at least as good as the median seat in
the theater and that this additional quantitative requirement had never gone
through notice and comment and thus could not be legally binding.2o' The
Sixth Circuit rejected Cinemark's argument on the same two grounds on which
the Supreme Court relied in Guernsey. First, it noted that under the Chenery II
principle the government was entitled to enforce the statute (and its own
regulation) via litigation without any further rulemaking.o 2 Second, it
concluded that DOJ's quantitative interpretation of its own regulation qualified
as an interpretive rule in any event, such that notice-and-comment procedures
194. Id.
195. Id. at 95.
196. Id. at 96-97.
197. Id. at 96.
198. 348 F.3 d 569 (6th Cir. 2003).
199. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (206)).
200. Cineniark, 348 F.3d at 573 (quoting 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, app. A, 5 4.33.3 (emphasis added and
code year omitted by the court)).





were not necessary.20 The government's enforcement action was warranted,
the court held, because the agency's interpretation of the lines-of-sight
regulation was a reasonable one -particularly in light of the deference that
agencies deserve when interpreting their own regulations.20 4
How, if at all, would a short cut regime alter the incentives for agencies in
situations like those in Guernsey and Cinemark? Not much, in all likelihood.
True, under the short cut, the Secretary and DOJ would know ex ante that they
would not be able to treat their reimbursement or median-seat guidelines as
legally binding because they had not submitted them to notice and comment.
But it is not clear that this would make any difference in the agency's conduct
as compared with the actual Guernsey and Cinemark cases. In neither case did
the agency or the reviewing court rely on a nonlegislative rule in any legally
binding sense. Rather, the courts in both cases held that the agency had
advanced a reasonable interpretation of the underlying statutory and regulatory
framework- and both courts emphasized that the agency could have done so
for the first time during the enforcement process without publishing any sort
of rule in advance. The Cinemark court even gestured in the direction of the
short cut, concluding its discussion by noting that "if the [enforcement] action
were not warranted, then enforcement should be denied on that ground alone,
and any APA notice-and-comment argument would be surplusage."2 o'
The trade-off is therefore of doubtful efficacy, since it asks agencies, as the
price of forgoing notice and comment, to surrender something -the ability to
"rely" on a nonlegislative rule at the enforcement stage-that they rarely
needed in the first place. Granted, the Chenery II principle has some limits: in a
smattering of cases, courts have rejected an agency's use of adjudication as an
abuse of discretion when the agency applied its new policy retroactively to the
detriment of parties that had relied on a longstanding contrary policy.2o' But
for the most part, unless the short cut were combined with an overruling of
Chenery II (something that short cut proponents do not appear to call for2 7)
we could expect agencies under a short cut regime to dispense with notice and
comment at least as often as they do now, confident that they could give effect
to their newly promulgated interpretations during the ordinary course of
203. Id. at 580 n.8.
204. Id. at 578-79.
205. Id. at 58o-81.
206. For a discussion of these cases, see William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of
Facts, and the Limitations ofLabels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 365-76 (2000).
207. Indeed, John Manning relies on an analogy to Chenery II as one of the principal rationales in
favor of the short cut. See Manning, supra note 66, at 901-14.
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enforcement.zos Meanwhile, proceeding by nonlegislative rule will often be
more attractive to agencies than proceeding by adjudication alone, if only
because the agency is spared the expense associated with investigation and
development of a factual record. Whether increased use of nonlegislative rules
is normatively attractive or not is beside the present point. The point, rather, is
that the short cut would not appreciably alter agencies' incentives, contrary to
the trade-off argument advanced by its proponents.2 o9
The third objection to the trade-off is the most fundamental. It asserts that
the public scrutiny that comes with notice and comment and the judicial
scrutiny that comes with post-enforcement review are fundamentally
dissimilar. Proponents of the short cut rely on a simple trade-off between these
mechanisms, but in fact they serve distinct functions and promote distinct
values. Accordingly, agencies that eschewed notice and comment under a short
cut regime would not simply "pay later" in the form of enhanced judicial
review-or, rather, they would pay in a very different currency, and the distinct
values of notice and comment would be lost in the transaction.
Those distinct values have already been mentioned: the mechanism of
notice and comment was designed to ensure an opportunity for interested
members of the public to participate in the process of agency policymaking by
2o8. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Thompson, 475 F. 3d 204, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2007) (relying on
Chenery II in rejecting the argument that the Secretary of Health and Human Services could
establish criteria defining the scope of undue hardship waivers only through notice-and-
comment rulemaking).
209. John Manning and Peter Strauss have suggested versions of the short cut under which
nonlegislative rules would be given precedential (or quasi-precedential) effect as opposed to
no legal effect whatsoever. See Manning, supra note 66, at 934 (arguing for a "reasoned
decisionmaking framework" under which "nonlegislative rules would ... merit something
resembling the level of obligation of an adjudicative precedent"); Strauss, supra note 162, at
843-49 (proposing a similar framework for what Strauss calls "publication rules," see id. at
804); Strauss, supra note 70, at 1467-68. To a large extent, such an approach would simply
formalize the rationale employed by the Guernsey and Cinemark courts: interpretive rules
would be upheld to the extent that they represented a reasonable outcome that could have
been reached through adjudication. Manning's and Strauss's proposals, however, would
work a change in current law in one respect: agencies would have to justify adequately any
departure from a nonlegislative rule (even a general statement of policy), just as they must
now justify any departure from an adjudicative precedent. This burden of adequate
justification is hard to quantify, compare FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
18oo, 1810-12 (2009), with id. at 1830-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but does seem greater than
the burden that agencies must currently carry in order to depart from a nonlegislative rule.
This version of the short cut, while superior to the "pure" version, does little to respond to
the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, see Mendelson, supra note 41, at 445-47, or to the
asymmetry between pre-promulgation notice and comment and post-enforcement judicial




making comments, raising objections, and suggesting alternatives to proposed
rules.2"o While post-enforcement judicial review can mimic these features, it
cannot fully recreate them because it occurs in the factual context of a particular
enforcement action, before generalist judges, and at the behest of the regulated
entity against whom that action has been taken."' Judge Williams may be
correct that "the threat of judicial review provides a spur to the agency to pay
attention to facts and arguments submitted in derogation of any rule not
supported by notice and comment, even as late as the enforcement
stage . . . ."m But even with liberal intervention standards, the "facts and
arguments submitted" at the post-enforcement stage are likely to exclude some
that would have been aired during the process of notice and comment.
Some observers contend that notice and comment does not really serve the
function of ensuring public participation in rulemaking. These observers note
that nowadays most rules have in effect been finalized long before the agency
issues its notice of proposed rulemaking.1 As former EPA general counsel
Elliott memorably put it:
No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-
comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining
input from interested parties. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions -a
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of
something which in real life takes place in other venues. 14
For Elliott, the only function that notice-and-comment rulemaking truly serves
is that of compiling a record for judicial review."
210. See, e.g., Trans-Pac. Freight Conference of Japan/Korea v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 650 F.2d
1235, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[Notice-and-comment rulemaking] allows all those who may
be affected by a rule an opportunity to participate in the deliberative process, while
adjudicatory proceedings normally afford no such protection to nonparties."); Asimow,
supra note 52, at 402 ("The APA notice and comment procedure infuses the rulemaking
process with significant elements of openness, accountability, and legitimacy.").
211. Cf Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (20o6) (suggesting
that the requirement of a concrete case distorts the development of the common law).
212. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
213. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 6, at 1495 ("[R]eal public participation- the kind of back and
forth dialogue in which minds (and rules) are really changed- primarily takes place in
various fora well in advance of a notice of proposed rulemaking appearing in the Federal
Register.").
214. Id. at 1492.
215. Id. at 1492-94.
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Even on this skeptical view, however, there is still value in allowing courts
to insist on public input before rules are promulgated. At the very least, robust
public participation in notice and comment enhances the later process of
judicial review by bringing to light technical issues that generalist judges might
not otherwise spot, thereby enabling courts to engage in meaningful scrutiny
of the resulting rules."1 This scrutiny, often categorized by courts under the
broad umbrella of "hard look" review, demands that agencies offer thorough
justifications for the rules that they promulgate, including responses to any
meaningful objections or alternatives aired during the comment period.
There is a vigorous and longstanding debate over the value of hard look
review, and in particular over whether it ought to take a "substantive" form
(under which the reviewing court takes a hard look at the agency's reasoning)
or a "procedural" form (under which the court aims to ensure that the agency
has taken a hard look at competing proposals and considerations).2" That
debate need not be resolved here. It is sufficient to note that the Supreme
Court has given its blessing to hard look review, at least of the procedural
type, 9 and that neither type would be fully practicable without the public
input elicited by notice-and-comment procedures. 2 20 A court's determination
of whether an agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem [or] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency" is ineluctably shaped by the facts and arguments
that were offered for the agency to consider at the time it crafted its policy.
216. Cf Pierce, supra note 31, at 84 ("Because courts lack the voluminous record available as the
basis for reviewing a legislative rule, it is difficult for them to detect arguable flaws in
interpretative rules or in policy statements.").
217. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1987);
Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cit.
1982); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cit. 1977).
218. For critical commentary on hard look review, see the sources collected in Seidenfeld, supra
note 181, at 483 n.1. For the locus classicus of substantive hard look review, see Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring). For the locus classicus of
procedural hard look review, see id. at 66-68 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
219. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-51 (1983);
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). A narrow
majority in the State Farm case appeared to endorse substantive hard look review as well. See
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51-57.
220. Cf Asimow, supra note 52, at 403 ("[B]y generating a record of public comment and agency
response, the notice and comment system facilitates pre-enforcement hard-look judicial
review, an important check on factually unsupported or arbitrary regulation.").




The argument here is not that pre-enforcement review is superior to post-
enforcement review; that debate is unlikely ever to be definitively resolved.m2
The argument is, rather, that the facts and arguments aired during notice and
comment, no matter when they are ultimately dealt with by a court, may differ
in kind from those aired during post-enforcement judicial review of a
nonlegislative rule. This is particularly true with respect to facts and arguments
raised by regulatory beneficiaries, who may - and often do - submit their views
to agencies during comment periods, but who are generally unable to obtain
judicial review of permissive or threshold-setting nonlegislative rules. Even
regulated entities may be less able or willing to make persuasive objections to a
nonlegislative rule once they have invested in compliance and the agency has
invested in enforcement.2
Proponents of the short cut might respond that post-enforcement judicial
review was never meant to be a perfect substitute for pre-promulgation public
input -that the trade-off is not a literal transaction but a rough equivalency
designed to show that agencies' ex ante incentives under a short cut regime
would not tip too far in the direction of eschewing notice and comment. What
short cut proponents have not shown, however, is that their favored regime
would protect the values served by notice and comment, especially where
technical complexity or the presence of highly diffuse regulatory beneficiaries
make post-enforcement judicial review a poor substitute.
B. Mead Does Not Rescue the Short Cut
As we have seen, the case for the short cut is not as strong as its supporters
claim. Recall, however, that those supporters have one additional argument up
their sleeves - the idea that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Mead Corp." decisively strengthens their case."' This additional argument
fails for three reasons.
222. For a (concededly inconclusive) attempt to define the circumstances under which post-
enforcement review is superior, see Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of
Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals To Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review ofAgency Rules,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85 (1997).
223. See id. at 107-08.
224- 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
225. See Gersen, supra note lo, at 1720-21; Manning, supra note 66, at 940 ("By denying Chevron
deference to nonlegislative rules, the Court [in Mead] makes them nonbinding in practice.
Such a default position, moreover, meaningfully distinguishes nonlegislative from
legislative rules without the confusing form of inquiry that direct judicial review of that
distinction has thus far entailed."). But see id. at 943 ("Mead's net effect on agency
deliberation may ultimately be quite small.").
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First, Mead's presumption that nonlegislative rules are ineligible for
Chevron deference is just that-only a presumption. In Mead itself, the Court
conceded that it had accorded Chevron deference to some nonlegislative rules in
the past,26 and suggested that it might do so again.2 7 The 2002 case of
Barnhart v. Walton bore out this suggestion.211 In Barnhart, the Court
confronted a provision of the Social Security Act that defined a disability as an
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any . . .
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months."2 2 9 Without notice and comment, the Social
Security Administration (SSA) issued an interpretation of this statute (and of
its own intervening regulations) stating that a claimant was not disabled if
"within 12 months after the onset of an impairment . . . the impairment no
longer prevents substantial gainful activity." 23o In other words, according to
the SSA's interpretation, a claim for benefits would be denied if the claimant's
inability to work lasted less than a year, even if the underlying impairment
lasted longer than a year.
In upholding the SSA's denial of benefits in Barnhart, the Court went out
of its way to reject the claimant's argument that the agency's interpretation was
not entitled to deference because it had initially been issued without notice and
comment. Mead, the Court emphasized, did not hold that nonlegislative rules
were automatically excluded from Chevron deference.' "In this case," the
Court concluded,
the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate
that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view
the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.232
226. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 ("[W]e have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even
when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.") (citing
NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-257, 263 (1995)).
227. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (stating that the fact that the ruling at bar "was not a product
of such formal process does not alone .. . bar the application of Chevron").
228. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 42 3 (d)(1)(A) (20o6).
23o. 65 Fed. Reg. 42,774 (2000).
231. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221-22.




In essence, the Court conflated the newer Chevron standard with the older
Skidmore standard,"' using the factors from the latter to determine the
applicability of the former. Not surprisingly, this has led to confusion in the
lower federal courts. 34 Regardless of the confusion created by Barnhart,
however, one thing is clear: nonlegislative rules are not automatically
disqualified from receiving Chevron deference.3
Second, even if the Court were to unravel the Barnhart tangle and hold
clearly that legislative rules are entitled to Chevron deference while
nonlegislative rules are reviewed under Skidmore, it is not at all clear that this
distinction between levels of scrutiny would substantially affect agency
incentives in practice.236 That is because Skidmore review can be quite
deferential, especially in technical contexts where courts are likely to view
agencies as having a comparative advantage in expertise. A recent study
demonstrated that agencies prevailed in more than sixty percent of cases in
which the Skidmore standard was applied by the federal courts of appeals over a
five-year period.' To be sure, Skidmore review might prove less favorable to
233. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
234. For an account of this confusion, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled
Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005). Compare Krzalic v. Republic
Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that Barnhart "suggests a merger
between Chevron deference and Skidmore's"), with id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("I
do not perceive [in Barnhart] any 'merger' between Chevron and Skidmore, which Mead took
such pains to distinguish." (citation omitted)).
23S. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-69 (20o6) (entertaining at length the
possibility that an interpretive rule might be eligible for Chevron deference); Edelman v.
Lynchburg CoIl., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (stating that "deference under Chevron ... does
not necessarily require an agency's exercise of express notice-and-comment rulemaking
power"); Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F-3d 49, 59-61 (2d Cir. 2004)
(applying Chevron deference to a general statement of policy issued without notice and
comment); cf Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (reading Mead as holding that "the existence of a formal
rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for according
Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute").
236. For an early post-Mead expression of skepticism on this score, see Ronald M. Levin, Mead
and the Prospective Exercise ofDiscretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 771, 796 (2002) (doubting that the
distinction between Chevron and Skidmore "is so powerful that it is likely to exert a strong
influence on agency behavior," and noting that "the difference between the two standards of
review is so elusive that most people can barely understand it").
237. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 1235, 1259-60, 1275 (2007); see also Hickman, supra note 132, at 1200
("[E]ven under the purportedly less deferential Skidmore review standard, judicial review of
interpretations of the [Internal Revenue Code] advanced in connection with refund claim
denials and deficiency notices may be quite deferential.").
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nonlegislative rules if courts were to emphasize the aspect of that standard that
turns on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration. "2 Still, in light of the
overall agency success rate in Skidmore-deference cases, it seems less likely that
an agency considering how to announce a policy or interpretation would
voluntarily embark on the expensive process of notice and comment for fear
that its announcement would otherwise receive "only" Skidmore as opposed to
Chevron deference. 39 Moreover, to echo the discussion above,4 0 the marginal
benefits of Skidmore from the standpoint of regulatory oversight seem lowest in
precisely those complex technical settings in which notice and comment would
best serve its core function of facilitating hard look review.
Third, even if Mead were consistently interpreted to mean that agency
statutory interpretations embodied in nonlegislative rules receive less deference
than those embodied in legislative rules, it would do nothing to disturb the
extraordinary deference accorded to agencies' interpretations of their own rules.
This deference -often called Seminole Rock deference, after a case in which the
Court held that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation "becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation""' is at least as powerful as Chevron deference. 42 Thus, to take just
two examples, the Supreme Court's decision in Barnhart v. Walton to uphold
SSA's denial of benefits was based to a large extent on the principle that
"[c]ourts grant an agency's interpretation of its own regulations considerable
legal leeway,"" and the Sixth Circuit in Cinemark emphasized that "[w]hen an
238. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
239. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 237, at 1276-78 (noting that comparative analysis of
government success rates under Skidmore and Chevron is difficult to perform, for reasons
that include selection bias, but concluding that "Skidmore is substantially more agency-
friendly than other scholars conducting post-Mead analysis have supposed"); Levin, supra
note 236, at 797 n.113 (reporting anecdotally that a government attorney could remember
only one instance in eleven years of agency service in which he and his colleagues even
discussed eventual standards of judicial review in determining what procedures to use for
rulemaking).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 213-221.
241. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). This form of deference is
sometimes called Auer deference, after the case in which the Court reaffirmed Seminole Rock.
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
242. For comparative discussion of Chevron and Seminole Rock, see, for example, John F.
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 627-31 (1996); and Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 899-900 (2001).
243. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461); see also Udall v.




agency is interpreting its own regulations, even greater deference is due to the
agency's interpretation."
Crucially, this greater deference applies even when the agency
interpretation in question is embodied in a nonlegislative rule." Indeed, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of Seminole Rock deference in a case in
which the agency's interpretation of its own regulations was embodied in
nothing more formal than an amicus curiae brief. 6 Because much, if not most,
agency policymaking turns on interpretations of existing regulations in
addition to (or rather than) interpretations of statutes,"7 Mead does less to
encourage the use of notice-and-comment procedures than may at first appear,
as Justice Scalia recognized in his Mead dissent."'
The idea that Mead has not made a decisive difference with respect to the
viability of the short cut should come as no surprise. After all, both Mead's
holding and its effect on judicial review of administrative action are notoriously
unclear."' One comprehensive, recent study concludes that the Supreme Court
applies Chevron in only a tiny minority of cases involving agency statutory
interpretations - and usually does not apply Chevron even when the Court's
244. United States v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2003).
245. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220 (2001)
(upholding an informal revenue ruling as an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own
regulations); Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3 d 1020, 1028 (9 th Cir. 2008); Smith v.
Nicholson, 451 F.3 d 1344, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 20o6).
246. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461; see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171
(2007) (granting Seminole Rock deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations set forth in an internal memorandum to agency staff that was generated in
response to litigation).
247. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3 d io15, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting a frequent
pattern by which agencies issue vaguely worded legislative rules that they subsequently
interpret through nonlegislative rules); Manning, supra note 242, at 614-15 (noting that
"regulations frequently play a more direct role than statutes in defining the public's legal
rights and obligations").
248. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Agencies
will now have high incentive to rush out barebones, ambiguous rules construing statutory
ambiguities, which they can then in turn further clarify through informal rulings entitled to
judicial respect.").
249. See generally Bressman, supra note 234 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court's decisions in
Mead and Barnhart have sowed confusion in the courts of appeals); Adrian Vermeule,
Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 347 (2003) (arguing that Mead has
led to flawed and incoherent D.C. Circuit decisions).
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own holdings render it applicable.5 o Instead, the study concludes, Chevron
coexists uneasily in the Court's case law alongside Skidmore, Seminole Rock, and
several other deference regimes, and in most cases the Court does not invoke
any particular deference regime at all.251 These findings tend to substantiate the
oft-echoed lament of two early commentators that the Supreme Court's
deference doctrines "have no more substance at the core than a seedless
grape." "2 More empirical work remains to be done, in particular to ascertain
whether deference regimes have a more determinate effect or a more
predictable scope in the lower federal courts, where most judicial review of
federal agency action takes place.25 What we do know, however, casts serious
doubt on the suggestion that Mead tips the scales decisively in favor of the
short cut.
CONCLUSION
By now, the perils of the short cut should be clear enough. Because of the
shortcomings of the trade-off argument, agencies under a short cut regime
would too often sidestep the public input that is necessary to protect the
interests of regulatory beneficiaries, to lay the foundation for meaningful hard
look review, and, more generally, to ensure a relatively participatory and
accountable form of regulatory governance. At the same time, however,
proponents of the short cut are right to warn against any test that would call
for notice and comment every time (or even most of the time) agencies make
what pass for rules under the APA. Such an approach would present agencies
with a Hobson's choice between expensive full-blown rulemaking and pure ad
hoc adjudication.
Once these options are eliminated, what is left is a middle ground that
more or less describes current doctrine, with all of its smog and muddle.
Agencies may issue nonlegislative rules so long as they do not intend their rules
to have legal effect, or so long as they do not bind themselves or others, or so
long as they are merely interpreting existing legal obligations rather than
creating new ones.
250. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1083,
1090 (2008).
251. Id.
252. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
771, 780 (1975).




It is not the object of this Article to defend every aspect of current doctrine.
No doubt courts could eliminate some of its ambiguities and indeterminacies
by turning a few more square corners. And few observers would dispute that
current doctrine sometimes errs in the direction of overincentivizing
procedural formality by classifying rules as legislative that were never intended
to be binding. Yet the lack of a cut-and-dried test for distinguishing between
legislative and nonlegislative rules has its advantages, not only for the courts
but also for the regulated public. A doctrine with some play in the joints allows
courts to tailor the requirement of notice and comment to circumstances in
which factors such as technical complexity or significant effects on regulatory
beneficiaries make public input more valuable - in a case like Appalachian
Power, for example" 4 -while allowing agencies to dispense with notice and
comment when such factors are absent-for example, in a case like
Warshauer."'
A rough analogy can be made to the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges in constitutional adjudication."6 A court engaged in the
traditional task of ascertaining whether a challenged rule is legislative or
nonlegislative - determining the rule's procedural validity in light of its text,
structure, and purpose -is, in essence, performing facial review."' A court that
adopted the short cut -waiting until a rule was enforced and then determining
its legal effect in light of its procedural provenance -would be performing as-
applied review.8 In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly declared a strong preference for as-applied adjudication, but in
practice it has often engaged in facial review, whether overtly or covertly. 9
That is because the as-applied model in its strongest form has proven unduly
rigid, leading the Court to depart from that model when circumstances (such
254. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 2o8 F-3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For discussion, see supra
text accompanying notes 97-105.
255. Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330 (lith Cir. 2009). For discussion, see supra text
accompanying notes lo6-114.
256. I have written at length about this distinction elsewhere. See David L. Franklin, Facial
Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41 (206); David L.
Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court,
36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689 (2009).
257. The analogy, as stated in the text, is only a rough one: for instance, current doctrine looks
beyond the face of the rule to patterns of enforcement in determining whether a rule is a
general statement of policy. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
258. Cf Manning, supra note 66, at 933 (labeling his version of the short cut "an as-applied
reasoned decisionmaking framework").
259. See generally sources cited supra note 256 (discussing the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges).
325
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
as a perception of improper legislative purpose) seemed to require it.o2 6 In the
administrative law context, as this Article has shown, the short cut is likewise
too rigid: it would deprive courts of the flexibility to insist, as a facial matter,
on notice-and-comment rulemaking when circumstances seem to require it. If
the price of that flexibility is a little doctrinal smog, it is a price that courts,
agencies, and litigants ought to be willing to pay.
260. Id.
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